Incident Videos

A total of 638 workers were evacuated from this flotel after it began to lean to one side when water entered a pontoon. The flotel was located about 80 kilometres offshore Campeche, Mexico. There were no injuries reported as a result of the sudden inclination. It was reported that a total loss of the flotel resulted.

[ Property Damage $160 Million. Estimated Current Value $177 Million ]

Image credit: PEMEX

On the night of April 12, 2004, during an attempt to make the first production batch of triallyl cyanurate (TAC) at MFG Chemical, Inc. (MFG) in Dalton, Georgia, a runaway chemical reaction released highly toxic and flammable allyl alcohol and toxic allyl chloride into the nearby community. The fire department ordered an evacuation of residents and businesses within a halfmile of the facility. The release forced more than 200 families from their homes. One MFG employee sustained minor chemical burns and 154 people received decontamination and treatment at the local hospital for chemical exposure, including 15 police and ambulance personnel assisting with the evacuation. Five residents required overnight hospitalization for breathing difficulties. The reactor continued venting toxic vapor for nearly eight hours and the evacuation order lasted more than nine hours.

KEY ISSUES:
• REACTIVE CHEMICALS PROCESS DESIGN
• PROCESS SCALE-UP
• EMERGENCY PLANNING & RESPONSE

ROOT CAUSES:
1. MFG did not understand or anticipate the reactive chemistry hazards. They did not make use of readily available literature on the hazards of reactive chemistry, or conduct a comprehensive literature search of the reactive chemistry specifically involved in manufacturing the product, which would have alerted them to the hazards involved in manufacturing TAC.
2. MFG did not perform a comprehensive process design and hazard review of the laboratory scale-up to full production before attempting the first production run.
3. MFG did not prepare and implement an adequate emergency response plan. They did not train or equip employees to conduct emergency mitigation actions.
4. MFG did not implement the EPA Risk Management Program or the OSHA Process Safety Management program prior to receiving the allyl alcohol. The regulations require comprehensive engineering analyses of the process, emergency planning, a pre-startup safety review, and coordination with the local community before receiving the covered chemical at the site and introducing the covered chemical into the process.

Image Credit: CSB

A natural gas pipeline that was situated within a plowed field exploded and caused a fire. The location of the explosion helped crews keep it contained. One home was voluntarily evacuated

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: News Channel 10 Amarillo

The Texas City disaster was an industrial accident that occurred April 16, 1947, in the Port of Texas City, Texas, at Galveston Bay. It was the deadliest industrial accident in U.S. history, and one of history’s largest non-nuclear explosions.

A mid-morning fire started on board the French-registered vessel SS Grandcamp (docked in the port), and detonated her cargo of approximately 2,200 tons (approximately 2,100 metric tons) of ammonium nitrate. This started a chain reaction of additional fires and explosions in other ships and nearby oil-storage facilities. The events killed a total of at least 581 people, including all but one member of the Texas City fire department.

The disaster triggered the first-ever class action lawsuit against the United States government, under the recently enacted Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), on behalf of 8,485 victims.

Image Credit: Carl E Linde / AP

The incident took place on Easter Monday the 16th April 2001. During the morning the SGP was operating normally and the Central Control Room (CCR) reported a quiet shift, with no alarms showing for the SGP. In the early afternoon there were only 185 people on site, rather than a normal weekday figure of about 800. Most of the staff were inside buildings preparing for the shift handover, which was due to occur at 3pm. A number of people were working in the open air.

At approximately 14.20 hrs a catastrophic failure of a section of pipework on the SGP plant occurred at an elbow just downstream of a water-into-gas injection point. The six inch diameter pipe P4363, (the overhead line carrying flammable gas under high pressure),ruptured releasing a huge cloud containing around 90% ethane/propane/butane. About 20-30 seconds later the gas cloud ignited. As a result a massive explosion and fire followed.

KEY LESSONS:

Management of Pipework Inspection
• Effective pipework inspection systems are a vital major accident prevention measure for high hazard pipework.
• Such systems should at least meet current industry good practice standard.
• Decisions on inspection intervals should be informed by suitable and sufficient information on process conditions and previous inspection findings.

Management of Change
• Effective management of change systems, which consider both plant and process modifications, are essential to prevent major accidents.
• Particular care is needed to ensure that ‘quick fix’ modifications, during the commissioning and early operation phases of new plant, are covered.

Management of Corrosion
• Systematic and thorough arrangements are necessary for the effective management of corrosion on major hazard installations.
• Such arrangements should ensure that any available information on relevant corrosion degradation mechanisms is identified and acted on.
• Adequate resource, including relevant expertise, should be applied to ensure that adequate standards are achieved and maintained.

Communication
• Effective communication is an important element of any safety management system. In the context of major hazard establishments the accurate recording and effective sharing of information and data relevant to plant corrosion is essential for major accident prevention.
• Communication systems should aim to actively involve the workforce in the prevention of major accidents as part of an adequately resourced process safety management system.

Image Credit: HSE

During the transfer of acetal from one vessel to another a fire and explosion occurred due a chemical reaction, which caused the rupture of one of the vessels.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Unidentified

On April 17, 2013, a fire and explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Company (WFC), a fertilizer blending, retail, and distribution facility in West, Texas. The violent detonation fatally injured 12 emergency responders and three members of the public. Local hospitals treated more than 260 injured victims, many of whom required hospital admission. The blast completely destroyed the WFC facility and caused widespread damage to more than 150 offsite buildings. The WFC explosion is one of the most destructive incidents ever investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) as measured by the loss of life among emergency responders and civilians; the many injuries sustained by people both inside and outside the facility fenceline; and the extensive damage to residences, schools, and other structures. Following the explosion, WFC filed for bankruptcy.

The explosion happened at about 7:51 pm central daylight time (CDT), approximately 20 minutes after the first signs of a fire were reported to the local 911 emergency response dispatch center. Several local volunteer fire departments responded to the facility, which had a stockpile of between 40 and 60 tons (80,000 to 120,000 pounds) fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN), not counting additional FGAN not yet offloaded from a railcar.

More than half of the structures damaged during the explosion were demolished to make way for reconstruction. The demolished buildings include an intermediate school (552 feet southwest of the facility), a high school (1,263 feet southeast), a two-story apartment complex with 22 units (450 feet west) where two members of the public were fatally injured, and a 145-bed nursing home (500 feet west) where many of the seriously injured civilians resided. A middle school (2,000 feet southwest) also sustained serious but reparable damage. Section 3 describes the incident and its consequences in detail.

KEY ISSUES:
• REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
• HAZARD AWARENESS
• EMERGENCY PLANNING & RESPONSE
• FERTILIZER GRADE AMMONIUM NITRATE STORAGE PRACTICES
• LAND USE PLANNING & ZONING

ROOT CAUSES:
1. The presence of combustible materials used for construction of the facility and the fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) storage bins, in addition to the West Fertilizer Company (WFC) practice of storing combustibles near the FGAN pile, contributed to the progression and intensity of the fire and likely resulted in the detonation.
2. The WFC facility did not have a fire detection system to alert emergency responders or an automatic sprinkler system to extinguish the fire at an earlier stage of the incident.
3. Regulatory, Insurance, Emergency Response, Emergency & Land Use Planning deficiencies.

Image credit: CSB

On April 20, 2010, a multiple-fatality incident occurred at the Macondo oil well approximately 50 miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico during temporary well-abandonment activities on the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) drilling rig. Control of the well was lost, resulting in a blowout—the uncontrolled release of oil and gas (hydrocarbons) from the well. On the rig, the hydrocarbons found an ignition source and ignited. The resulting explosions and fire led to the deaths of 11 individuals, serious physical injuries to 17 others, the evacuation of 115 individuals from the rig, the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, and massive marine and coastal damage from a reported 4 million barrels of released hydrocarbons.

BP was the main operator/lease holder responsible for the well design, and Transocean was the drilling contractor that owned and operated the DWH. On the day of the incident, the crew was completing temporary abandonment of the well so that it could be left in a safe condition until a production facility could return later to extract oil and gas from it.

Abandonment activities would essentially plug the well. Earlier, a critical cement barrier intended to keep the hydrocarbons below the seafloor had not been effectively installed at the bottom of the well. BP and Transocean personnel misinterpreted a test to assess cement barrier integrity, leading them to erroneously believe that the hydrocarbon bearing zone at the bottom of the well had been sealed. When the crew removed drilling mud from the well in preparation to install an additional cement barrier, the open blowout preventer (BOP) was the only physical barrier that could have potentially prevented hydrocarbons from reaching the rig and surrounding environment. The ability of the BOP to act as this barrier was contingent primarily upon human detection of the kick and timely activation and closure of the BOP.

Removing drilling mud after the test allowed hydrocarbons to flow past the failed cement barrier toward the DWH. The hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir for almost an hour without human detection or the activation of the automated controls to close the BOP. Eventually, oil and gas passed above the BOP and forcefully released onto the rig. In response, the well operations crew manually closed the BOP. Oil and gas that had already flowed past the BOP continued to gush onto the rig, igniting and exploding. The explosion likely activated an automatic emergency response system designed to shear drillpipe passing through the BOP and seal the well, but it was unsuccessful.

KEY ISSUES:
• BOP TECHNICAL FAILURE ANALYSIS
• BARRIER MANAGEMENT AT MACONDO
• SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
• HUMAN FACTORS
• ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
• SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
• RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
• CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
• SAFETY CULTURE

ROOT CAUSES:
1. Technical Factors
2. Human and Organizational Factors
3. Regulatory Factors

Image Credit: CSB

A fire occurred in a company producing ammonia, and other chemical products. The facility was severely damaged in the catastrophic fire.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)

An explosion occurred in a glycol unit refining tower of a petrochemical plant

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: CCTV

On April 23, 2004, an explosion and fire killed five and seriously injured three workers at the Formosa Plastics Corporation, IL (Formosa-IL) PVC manufacturing facility in Illiopolis, Illinois. The explosion occurred after a large quantity of highly flammable vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) was inadvertently released from a reactor and ignited. The explosion and fire that followed destroyed much of the facility and burned for two days. Local authorities ordered residents within one mile of the facility to evacuate.

KEY ISSUES:
• HUMAN FACTORS
• HAZARD EVALUATION
• INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE

ROOT CAUSES:
1. Borden Chemical did not adequately address the potential for human error.
2. Formosa-IL did not adequately address the potential for human error.
3. Formosa-IL relied on a written procedure to control a hazard with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Image Credit: CSB

A piping leak resulted in a fire in this refinery coker unit. Smoke rose to over 3,000 feet, and the coker was shut down for approximately two months.

[ Property Damage $120 Million. Estimated Current Value $204 Million ]

Image credit: Tosco

During the conversion of one of the platform wells from oil to gas production, a high-pressure gas pocket was encountered that forced the drill pipe out of the well. The business operations platform (BOP) failed to shut in the well, and sparks, caused by the drill pipe that was ejected from the well hitting one of the platform legs, ignited the escaping gas. The fire lasted for 31 days. The majority of the topside structure was destroyed and the facility was later declared a total loss. Redesign of the production module was completed in 45 days in an effort to shorten the loss of production as much as possible. Full production was restored 18 months after the loss.

[ Property Damage $330 Million. Estimated Current Value $762 Million ]

Image credit: Petrobras

On April 25, 2002, a chemical waste-mixing incident occurred at Kaltech Industries Group, Inc., a sign manufacturer located in the Chelsea district of New York City. At least 36 people were injured, including members of the public and six firefighters. Kaltech employees were consolidating hazardous waste from smaller containers into two larger drums when the explosion and fire occurred.

The Kaltech facility was located in a mixed-occupancy building in a densely populated urban area. Because the highly confined workspace in the basement offered limited pathways for the explosion to vent, there was extensive damage to the 10-story building. Street traffic was restricted for several days, and building tenants faced significant business interruptions.

KEY ISSUES:
• HAZARD COMMUNICATION
• HAZARDOUS WASTE HANDLING
• MUNICIPAL OVERSIGHT

ROOT CAUSES:
1. Kaltech did not develop or maintain a chemical hazard communication program in accordance with established OSHA standards.
2. Kaltech did not manage its hazardous waste in accordance with established EPA regulations.

Image Credit: CSB

On April 26, 1986, the Number Four RBMK reactor at the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, Ukraine, went out of control during a test at low-power, leading to an explosion and fire that demolished the reactor building and released large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. Safety measures were ignored, the uranium fuel in the reactor overheated and melted through the protective barriers. RBMK reactors do not have what is known as a containment structure, a concrete and steel dome over the reactor itself designed to keep radiation inside the plant in the event of such an accident. Consequently, radioactive elements including plutonium, iodine, strontium and caesium were scattered over a wide area. In addition, the graphite blocks used as a moderating material in the RBMK caught fire at high temperature as air entered the reactor core, which contributed to emission of radioactive materials into the environment.

Image Credit: Getty

On April 26, 2018, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at the Superior Refinery Company LLC refinery in Superior, Wisconsin (‘Husky Superior Refinery’). The incident occurred in the refinery’s Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU). In preparation for the shutdown, the refinery brought in hundreds of contractors and increased operations staffing. The contractors were performing many tasks such as electrical work, preparing for chemical cleaning, building scaffolding, and welding. As a result of the explosion, thirty-six people sought medical attention, including eleven refinery and contract workers who suffered OSHA recordable injuries. In addition, a large portion of Superior, Wisconsin was evacuated. The refinery was shutting down in preparation for a five-week turnaround when an explosion occurred, sending several people to area hospitals with injuries.

KEY ISSUES:
• PYROPHORIC IRON SULFIDE

Image credit: CSB

Bulk Terminals was a storage tank farm with 78 tanks ranging in size up to 4900 m3. At about 12:30 hours on Friday 26 April 1974 a dull thud was heard and fumes were seen rising from the bund surrounding a 3300 m3 tank of silicon tetrachloride. It was discovered that a pressure relief valve on a 6-inch line leading to the tank had been inadvertently closed. The pressure in the system was sufficient to burst a flexible coupling in the line, shifting the piping system and cracking a 3-inch line on the tank wall. Liquid silicon tetrachloride escaped forming an irritant cloud containing hydrogen chloride gas.

The terminal management waited for the owners of the chemical to take emergency action and the fire service did not respond, as there was no fire. The EPA sent lime trucks to neutralise the chemical, but these were refused entry to the site. By 15:00 hours the cloud was 400 m wide, 300-450 m high and 1600 m long.

At 04:10 hours on Saturday 27 April, foam was added to blanket the liquid in the bund but this failed. At 09:00 hours fuel oil was added along with eight truck loads of lime. The vaporisation reduced dramatically and operations began to transfer the liquid from the damaged tank. At 08:00 hours on Sunday 28th April, it began to rain. Power lines were corroded by the hydrochloric acid in the rain, and four pumps became inoperable due to corrosion before a general power failure stopped all pumping.

The materials added into it had reduced the capacity of the bund, and a further pit had to be dug to take the overflow in the event of a full tank failure. It was attempted to seal the leak on the tank using quick drying cement. The first attempt failed and it wasn’t until 23:30 hours on Monday 29 April that the leak was sealed. It took until 3 May to empty the tank and until 15 May before emissions had reduced to tolerable levels. One person was killed, 160 hospitalised and 16,000 people were evacuated during this incident.

KEY ISSUES:
• RELIEF SYSTEMS / VENT SYSTEMS
• DESIGN CODES – PIPEWORK
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE / SPILL CONTROL
• SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

Image Credit: Chicago Fire Dept

A runaway chemical reaction occurred at Corden Pharma Ltd in Cork on Monday 28th April 2008. The incident resulted in the death of one operator and serious injury to another. The investigation carried out jointly between the Health and Safety Authority and Chilworth showed that the immediate cause of the incident was due to omission of acetone in reactor K6003 prior to Diethylcarbamoyl chloride (DECC) addition during synthesis of the acyloxypyridinium salt precursor to 2-cyano-3-methylpyridine. This resulted in a higher than expected adiabatic temperature rise leading to a two-stage decomposition, firstly of the acyloxypyridinium salt and then of the Picoline-Noxide starting material. The energy of the event was significant and resulted in considerable distortion of the reactor and release of contents at high temperature and pressure. The pressure wave resulted in significant building damage and ejection of debris. The exact reason why acetone was omitted has never been established although, with such a potentially severe consequence, the investigation concluded that more should have been done to eliminate the possibility of human error for this process step. The investigation also highlighted deficiencies in the sites execution of its process safety management systems, particular its HAZOP / risk assessment for this process.

Image credit: Independent.ie

A shelter-in-place was ordered when a fire broke out following an explosion in the propylene refrigeration section of an ethylene unit. The fire, which burned for three days, forced the shutdown of the facility for approximately six months, but caused no deaths or serious injuries.

[ Property Damage $200 Million. Estimated Current Value $268 Million ]

Image credit: Mark M. Hancock

Two firefighters were injured tackling a blaze at a refinery. The incident occurred when crude oil leaked from a pipe supplying the refinery from bulk storage tanks.

[ Property Damage $110 Million. Estimated Current Value $147 Million ]

Image credit: ISAB

In the early morning hours of May 1, 2002, a fire erupted at the Third Coast Industries Friendswood facility, located in an unincorporated area of Brazoria County, Texas. The facility (which blended and packaged motor oils, hydraulic oils, and engine and other lubricants) was inadequately designed and protected to prevent the spread of fire.

Firefighters arrived at the scene within minutes, but had insufficient means to fight the fire, which burned for more than 24 hours. The fire consumed 1.2 million gallons of combustible and flammable liquids and destroyed the site. One hundred nearby residents were evacuated, a local school was closed, and significant environmental cleanup was necessary due to fumes and runoff. No employees or firefighters were injured during the incident..

KEY ISSUES:
• FIRE CONTROL
• CONSENSUS STANDARDS
• FIRE CODES

ROOT CAUSES:
1. Third Coast did not conduct an adequate fire protection analysis to ensure implementation of fire protection measures.
2. The Third Coast facility fire suppression system was inadequate for detecting and warning of fire or smoke or for stopping fire spread.
3. The Third Coast facility lacked adequate control measures to limit the spread of the initial fire.

Image Credit: CSB

Workers were preparing to check a compressor in the nitroparaffin unit when they noticed a small fire and sounded the plant fire alarm. About 30 seconds later, an explosion occurred, which was followed by a series of smaller explosions. The effects of the initial explosion were reported as far away as eight miles from the plant. Additionally, the initial explosion completely damaged an area of the plant approximately the size of a city block. Subsequent fires were reported to have burned for more than seven hours. Although the incident did not damage the two ammonia units on site, the entire plant was temporarily shut down for precautionary measures.

[ Property Damage $120 Million. Estimated Current Value $257 Million ]

Image credit: No credit

On May 3, 2019, a silicone manufacturing process generated a flammable gas inside an enclosed production building at the AB Specialty Silicones (‘AB Specialty’) facility in Waukegan, Illinois. At approximately 9:30 p.m., the flammable vapor cloud found an ignition source and ignited, causing an explosion and fire. The flammable vapor originated from the area where AB Specialty was making a silicon hydride emulsion.

The explosion fatally injured four AB Specialty employees and caused serious injury to another AB Specialty employee. At the time of the incident there were nine AB Specialty employees onsite. The explosion heavily damaged the AB Specialty’s production building. Additionally, the force from the explosion was felt up to 20 miles away in the surrounding communities, and some nearby businesses sustained damage from the blast. Post-incident, AB Specialty has resumed some of its operations at another location.

KEY ISSUES:
• FLAMMABLE GAS DETECTION
• FLAMMABLE GAS VENTILATION

Image credit: CSB

At about 12:07 a.m. on May 4, 2009, highly flammable vapor, released from a waste recycling process, ignited and violently exploded, severely injuring two employees and slightly injuring two others at Veolia ES Technical Solutions, LLC. Multiple explosions afterward significantly damaged every structure on the site. Residences and businesses in the surrounding community also sustained considerable damage. The fire was declared under control by 10:38 a.m. that day.

KEY ISSUES:
• UNSAFE BUILDING SITING
• ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF SYSTEMS
• PLANT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

ROOT CAUSES:
1. The vent devices were not designed to contain or control hazardous and/or toxic vapor.
2. No record existed of a process hazard analysis (PHA) to evaluate the siting of the lab/operations building so close to the operating units.

Image credit: CSB

Enbridge responded to an explosion on Line 10 of its Texas Eastern Transmission Co. (Tetco) system in Fleming County, Kentucky, and said Tuesday that it has shut-in a section of the pipeline and secured the area. No injuries were reported.

The incident has reportedly impacted more than 1 billion cubic feet of daily north-to-south capacity on the system, sending natural gas futures higher after gaining Monday on falling production and higher anticipated demand due to predicted cold weather.

Line 10 is a 30-inch pipeline that is part of Enbridge’s Texas Eastern Natural Gas system.

Toronto-based Enbridge releases a brief statement in response to the blast.

“Enbridge is continuing to respond to the incident that occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. ET, Monday, May 4, 2020, on its Line 10 natural gas pipeline in Fleming County, Kentucky. There were no injuries,” the company said.

“Our crews are on site and have secured the area. The impacted section of pipe was shut-in following the incident and remains isolated.”

Enbridge said it has notified county, state and federal agencies and officials and reportedly notified customers of a force majeure event resulting in an unplanned outage.

Genscape analyst Josh Garcia said in a note to clients early Tuesday morning that the blast occurred north of its Owingsville Compressor and “just upstream” of where an Enbridge pipeline explosion occurred in 2019.

Image Credit: Lex18

An explosion at a plant that manufactured ammonium perchlorate (AP) for rocket fuel flattened the local industrial park, left a crater 125 meters across, and cracked walls 15 miles away. Two people were killed. The cause was thought to be a fire in a batch dryer. The initial explosion was at 11:53 and was equivalent to 108 tons of TNT, with a second explosion four minutes later equivalent to 235 t of TNT. Approximately 50% of the buildings in the nearby town of Henderson, Nevada were destroyed, at cost of US$70 million. A natural gas pipeline that ran under the plant was ruptured in the event and burned for one week.

[ Property Damage $300 Million. Estimated Current Value $693 Million ]

Image credit: Las Vegas Review-Journal

At 3:37 a.m. on May 5, 1988, an explosion occurred in the catalytic cracking unit (CCU) of an oil and gas refinery. The explosion apparently was the result of corrosion of an 8-inch (200 mm) vapor line. This vapor line, under 270 pounds per square inch (1,900 kPa) pressure, ran from a 10-inch (250 mm) header that originated as the main overhead vapor line from the depropanizer column. The apparent instantaneous line failure released approximately 17,000 pounds (7,700 kg) of hydrocarbon vapor for approximately 30 seconds. A possible ignition source could have been the unit’s superheater furnace. The damage pattern indicated that the explosion was probably an aerial explosion with an epicenter located in the area between the depropanizer and the CCU control room. Employees #1, #2, #4, #5, and #7 were found fatally injured inside the CCU control room as a direct result of the blast. Employee #3 was found fatally injured approximately 30 feet (9.1 m) outside the west side of the CCU control room as a direct result of the blast. Employee #6 was fatally injured while he was exiting the GO-1 South control room. Damage from the explosion radiated one mile (1.6 km) from the center of the explosion and debris could be found as far as five miles (8.0 km) from the center of the explosion. The blast could be heard approximately 25 miles (40 km) away in New Orleans. There were reports that the blast set off burglar alarms in New Orleans. The explosion caused a fire to burn for eight hours at the oil refinery before it was brought under control. Chemicals that escaped during the explosion resulted in cars and homes being covered by a black film. The governor declared a state of emergency in Norco and St. Charles Parish. Seven shell workers were killed during the explosion and 48 residents and Shell workers were injured in the explosion. The explosion released 159 million pounds (72 kt) of toxic chemicals into the air, which led to widespread damage and the evacuating on 4,500 people.

[ Property Damage $288 Million. Estimated Current Value $665 Million ]

Image credit: Fort Myers Fire Academy

At least 12 people were killed and 129 injured in an explosion and fire at a petrochemicals plant that manufactured polybutadiene. In addition, thousands of people were evacuated from adjacent factories and communities within a three-kilometre-radius of the site. The explosion and subsequent fire sent thick black smoke into the air above the site. The deaths and injuries were as a result of blast injuries, burns, and inhalation of toxic fumes. It was reported that the explosion and fire occurred while workers were cleaning the polymer production line to change between batches, using toluene as a cleaning solvent.

[ Property Damage $143 Million. Estimated Current Value $156 Million ]

Image credit: Rigzone

A devastating explosion Tuesday afternoon at an automotive plastics plant in Ottaviano, Italy, killed one worker and injured two, states the Facebook page for the country’s chief firefighting agency.

Video posted by Vigili del Fuoco shows a shattered industrial complex complete with wrecked cars, collapsed fencing and roofs stripped to the structural steel. Likewise, video posted to YouTube by nearby residents shows extensive damage to nearby homes.

Adler Plastics, based in Ottaviano, is a multi-national corporation with 58 plants in 19 countries. The company specializes in plastics used for acoustic and thermal comfort in high value automobiles

Authorities identified the single fatality as Vincenzo Lanza, 55, from Ottaviano. The injured workers were taken to hospitals in Nola and Cardarelli.

What one newspaper described as a ‘crazy roar’ heard more than 10 kilometers away preceded the 4 p.m. blast. That same publication, Il Riformista, said the blast originated in a portion of the facility occupied by ovens used to heat the plastics.

Air quality monitoring of the black smoke rising from the wreckage is in progress, officials said

Image Credit: iNews24.it

Five people have serious injuries after an explosion at Grosvenor coal mine at Moranbah in central Queensland’s Bowen Basin.

Key points:
– Five workers have suffered serious injuries after an explosion at the coal mine
– The injured have significant burns to their torsos and airways
– Mining company Anglo American says the mine has been evacuated and all other personnel are accounted for

The patients suffered burns to their upper bodies and airways and were taken to Moranbah Hospital in a serious condition.

Ambulance crews were called to the scene just after 3:00pm and multiple rescue helicopters were called in.

A spokesperson for Queensland Mines Minister Anthony Lynham said the explosion took place at Grosvenor coal mine, which is operated by Anglo American.

In a statement, mining company Anglo American said it was in the process of evacuating the mine and the emergency response was underway.

“Five people have been injured and transported to hospital. All of the injured people’s families have been contacted,” it read.

Image Credit: ABC News

A gas leak at an Indian chemical factory has killed at least 11 people and hospitalised hundreds. The styrene tanks had been left unattended due to India’s coronavirus lockdown.

The LG Chemical plant, located in Visakhapatnam on India’s east coast, had been offline due to India’s coronavirus lockdown which began on 24 March. Relaxing of lockdown restrictions led to the plant restarting operations, which is when the leak occurred. Maintenance personnel were on-site at the time of the leak.

Two 5,000 t tanks of styrene leaked due a fault in the refrigeration unit, according to The Hindu, which created a styrene vapour cloud that spread around 3 km from the plant and affected five villages. It occurred around 03:00 local time on 7 May and at least 11 people were killed, including two children.

According to The Guardian, the gas caused people to collapse in the streets as they tried to evacuate. Dead cattle were also lying in the streets. Reports suggest 300–1,000 people have been hospitalised, with hospitals already under strain due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Victims suffer from a burning sensation in their eyes as well as breathing difficulties, with some needing ventilators. The BBC reported that according to officials, most should recover.

The gas leak is now under control, according to The New York Times.

The accident echoes the Bhopal tragedy in India in 1984, when a gas leak from a pesticide plant killed thousands and caused chronic illnesses for at least 100,000 people in the area.

Image Credit: AFP

An explosion, caused by sodium metal reacting with water, occurred in a chemical plant in Mohekou Bengbu City Industrial Park. The fire was put off in 1 h.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)

A 30-inch diameter crude oil pipeline failed and destroyed three spheroids, pumping units, and other equipment. Ignition was caused by motor vehicles.

At least 22 people were injured when a crude oil tanker burst into flames at one of Indonesia’s busiest ports on Monday (May 11) with rescuers scrambling to reach dozens trapped on board, an official said.

Two explosions were heard shortly before the blaze erupted on the 250m long Jag Leela, belching huge clouds of thick black smoke into the air.

Firefighters on board another boat battled to put out the inferno on the Indonesia flagged vessel that was docked for repairs at North Sumatra’s Belawan port.

Emergency personnel rushed 22 injured sailors to hospital with dozens more still trapped on the tanker, said local police chief Dayan, who goes by one name.

The cause of the explosion and fire had yet to be determined, he said.

The blaze spread to at least one other vessel docked beside the oil tanker while the force of the explosion caused minor damage to nearby homes, Dayan added.

Image Credit: AFP

On Tuesday 11 May 2004, at about noon, an explosion occurred at Grovepark Mills, Maryhill, Glasgow which caused the substantial collapse of the former Mill building. As a result, 9 people lost their lives and 45 people were seriously injured or exposed to the risk of death or injury.

The immediate cause of the explosion was the escape of LPG from the substantially corroded underground pipework at the cracked right-angled bend close to the southern wall of the building, the tracking of the escaped gas into the basement of the building at the west end, the accumulation of the gas in the basement to a point where it constituted an explosive mixture in air, and the ignition of that mixture.

Image Credit: HSE

An explosion and fire razed a chemical factory in the Bandar Kinrara Industrial Park Fire & Rescue Department deployed eight fire trucks and 54 fire fighters. It was reported that the spark from the factory’s production floor ignited the highly flammable Hexane

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: The Star

A natural gas drilling rig sank in the Caribbean Sea, but all 95 workers were evacuated safely and there was no reported leakage. The sinking was caused by a sudden surge of water entering one of the submarine rafts that the platform legs floated on. Automatic subsea safety valves meant the well was secure and no leakage of oil occurred.

[ Property Damage $235 Million. Estimated Current Value $270 Million ]

Image credit: AFP

An electrical discharge in Acton Technologies company caused a fire in a warehouse were acetone was stored. School evacuation

Proximate causes:
• Hazardous work exposure

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Times Leader

Ammonia release at recycling center workers was evacuated. Shelter in place was issued in nearby areas.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: BBC

On 15 May, an explosion at a chemicals plant in an industrial zone in Venice, Italy seriously burned two workers and sent clouds of smoke and flames into the sky, reports Reuters.

Citing local media, Reuters states that the explosion “hit” 3V Sigma, a specialty chemicals company. Reportedly, the blast prompted local authorities to order residents to stay indoors and close windows.

The scene was attended by ambulances and fire services, as well as officials from environmental agency ARPAV.

According to the news agency, an official from the civil protection department, Gianpaolo Bottacin, said that the area was blocked off to prevent the fire from extending beyond the 3V Sigma site. He added that he doubted it would be put out any time soon. The report does not note if or when the fire was extinguished.

Image Credit: Vigili del Fuoco via AP

A leakage of Carbon disulfide cooling pipe occurred in Ruixing company. 8 killed and 6 injured in the following rescue process.

Proximate causes:
• Inadequate tools, equipment & vehicles (pipe leaking)

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)

An explosion occurred in a chemical container

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)

A faulty temperature probe on a 600,000-metric-ton-per-year ethylene plant initiated an isolation of the hydrogenation reactor located within the cold section. While the operators were attempting to regain normal control, the pressure relief system operated. About the same time, fire was noted near grade level at the base of the de-ethanizer column. The source of fuel was believed to have been a flange at the de-ethanizer column reboiler or in the relief system pipe work. Leaking hydrocarbon, mostly propylene at 375 psig, was possibly ignited by hot steam piping. The intense fire rapidly engulfed the adjoining ethylene and propylene distillation columns and spread 180 feet to the storage area. Eventually, one vertical pressurized propane storage tank exploded, its top section traveling 1,500 feet and missing a gas holder by 30 feet. Two other propylene tanks toppled; one onto a pipe rack, and the other against an ethylene tank. All were protected by deluge waterspray systems, which apparently were ineffective under the intense fire exposure. Five of the eight ethylene and propylene tanks collapsed or exploded. The fire also spread to the API separator and to three floating roof tanks. Pipe racks, motor control centers, and pumps were severely damaged or destroyed. A few minutes after the fire brigade responded, the ethylene column released its 9,300 US gallon inventory, destroying one of the plant’s two foam trucks. Assisted by outside fire fighting agencies, the plant fire brigade brought the fire under control over 40 hours and finally extinguished it four days after the initial ignition.

[ Property Damage $74 Million. Estimated Current Value $185 Million ]

Image credit: No credit

An explosion at Kuraray America on May 19, 2018, injured 21 workers at the EVAL facility in Pasadena, Texas. The facility manufactures ethylene vinyl-alcohol copolymers, sold as EVAL. Kuraray America is a Tokyo-based specialty chemical manufacturer.

During pre-startup pressure-testing activities of a chemical reactor, an abnormal high-pressure condition occurred and over 2,000 pounds of ethylene were released to the atmosphere from a pressure relief valve. The ethylene vapors ignited, resulting in worker injuries. Twenty-one injured workers were transported to off-site medical facilities for treatment.

KEY ISSUES:
• HOT WORK

Image credit: CSB

Two people were injured by an oil tank explosion in Galveston, Texas on May 19. Local officials said workers had been conducting welding near or on the crude oil storage tank before the explosion happened at the storage terminal on the coast of Texas, southeast of Houston.

The blast happened at the Pelican Island Storage Terminal where tanks can hold up to 2 million gallons of crude oil. A fire was caused by the explosion, but firefighters were able to put the blaze out by using foam cannons before it could spread.

The nearby Texas A&M University issued a shelter-in-place order for those on the campus. The condition of the two injured workers is unknown.

The oil storage terminal is leased by Enjet, LLC. According to its website, Enjet specialises in the worldwide marketing, blending and storage of carbon black feedstock oils, fuel oils and feedstocks.

Image Credit: KPRC

On Wednesday 23 May 1984, a group of 44 people was assembled in a valve house set into a hillside at the outfall end of the Lune/Wyre Transfer Scheme at Abbeystead. The visitors were attending a presentation to allay anxieties on the effects of the installation on the winter flooding of the lower Wyre Valley.

As part of this presentation, water was to be pumped over the weir regulating the flow of water into the Wyre. Shortly after pumping commenced there was an intense flash, followed immediately by an explosion causing severe damage to the valve house.

Sixteen people were killed; no one escaped without injury from the valve house.

The explosion was caused by the ignition of a mixture of methane and air, which had accumulated in the valve house. The methane had been displaced from a void, which had formed in the end of the Wyresdale Tunnel during a period of 17 days before the explosion when no water was pumped through the system.

No source of ignition for the explosion has been positively identified. Thorough examination and testing of the electrical equipment has not revealed any faults likely to have caused ignition and there is insufficient evidence to confirm any of the other explanations which have been considered. Smoking in the Valve House was not prohibited because the likelihood of a flammable atmosphere arising there had not been envisaged.

KEY ISSUES:
• DESIGN CODES – PLANT
• LEAK / GAS DETECTION
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• TRAINING

Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/13697/the-abbeystead-explosion.pdf

Image Credit: HSE

On May 24, 2017, an explosion occurred at the Midland Resource Recovery (MRR) facility in Philippi, West Virginia, killing two workers and severely injuring another worker. The founder and president of MRR was one of the victims. The CSB initiated an investigation of the incident and deployed an investigative team on May 28, 2017. While the CSB was investigating this incident, the MRR facility experienced a second explosion, on June 20, 2017. This explosion fatally injured a contractor employed by Specialized Professional Services, Inc. (SPSI). MRR had hired SPSI to perform investigation and mitigation work at its Philippi facility following the May 24, 2017, explosion.

The CSB determined that the probable cause of these incidents was reactive, unstable chemicals that exploded when workers tried to drain the uncharacterized, chemically treated liquid from natural gas odorizer equipment. The CSB investigation found that MRR lacked an effective safety management system to identify and control hazards from reactive chemicals. Among other things, MRR had no formal hazard identification process in place to analyze or characterize what chemicals were inside the odorizer vessels (and in what quantity) before decommissioning and chemically treating this equipment with sodium hypochlorite. The company also lacked effective safeguards to prevent unexpected or uncontrolled chemical reactions.

Following these catastrophic incidents, MRR asserts that it has stopped using reactive chemicals, including sodium hypochlorite, and the company now uses a proprietary process to remove the mercaptan smell from decommissioned odorization equipment.

KEY ISSUES:
• INEFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF REACTIVE CHEMICAL HAZARDS
• LACK OF A PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
• PERSISTING GAPS IN FEDERAL SAFETY REGULATIONS FOR REACTIVE CHEMICAL HAZARDS

ROOT CAUSES:
1. The company did not conduct a formal evaluation of the reactive chemistry, perform a hazard analysis, and ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place to prevent reactive chemical incidents.
2. The company did have a thorough and complete understanding of their reactive chemistry under design conditions and under all foreseeable abnormal conditions.

Image credit: CSB

A fire occurred in the terpene resin production line reactor overheating, and it damaged an area of 800-900 square meters

Proximate causes:
• Inadequate tools, equipment & vehicles (overheat from reactor of Terpene dilute resin leads the final pipeline explosion)

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)

An abnormal chemical reaction occurred during the batch production of a thermoplastic rubber product, resulting in an explosion at this plant. As a result of the explosion the reactor, process controls, accessories, control room, and building for this production unit were completely destroyed.

The fire then spread to involve part of the tank farm, resulting in the destruction of five atmospheric storage tanks. At approximately 12:30, the first of four one million US gallon and a 500,000 US gallon styrene storage tanks exploded. A fire fighting attack using cooling water and foam hose streams was used to prevent the fire from involving other nearby storage tanks, two of which contained butadiene. The fire was extinguished after approximately nine hours.

[ Property Damage $182 Million. Estimated Current Value $363 Million ]

Image credit: Mike Cottrell

On 29th May 2000 at 18:07 p.m. all power was lost to No. 1, 5 & 10 electrical substations that supply electrical power to the North Side of the Complex which contains the Oil Refinery, various chemical plants, utility plants and logistics facilities.

As a result, emergency shutdown of the Oil Refinery and the chemical plants on the North Side occurred and the utility plants were also affected due to a loss of power to the main cooling water pump systems. (There was some smoky flaring visible as a result of the emergency shutdown.)

In addition because of the duration of the power failure, a controlled shutdown of some other facilities elsewhere on-site (some chemical plants on the South Side and the Kinneil operations) was also necessary because the supply of steam for the correct operation of the flare system could not be maintained.

The HSE concluded that the power loss which occurred on the 29th May 2000 was caused by an earth fault on a 33kV underground power cable between No.1 and No.5 sub-station and the failure of the 33kV circuit breaker in No.1 sub-station to trip and clear the fault.

The source of the earth failure was not immediately apparent. The cable which failed was situated in the bottom part of the excavated trench, almost in the side wall of the trench and only protruded from its protective cable tile over a short length.

The fault was ultimately cleared by two 33kV circuit breakers in No.2 electrical sub-station resulting in power loss to No.1, No.5 and No.10 electrical sub-stations.

The immediate cause of the power distribution failure was a combination of two direct causes:

The Earth Fault
Forensic evidence indicated that the earth fault was caused by physical damage to the cable from an air powered tool known as a clayspade.The
clayspade equipment was operated by a number of different personnel during the construction of the trench and the cable was protected over the majority of its length, except in the location where the damage occurred, by the protective cable tile system. All personnel were aware of the responsibility to report any problems during the construction of the trench but none were reported. As a result of the damage the integrity of the lead sheath on the cable was breached, allowing water ingress, weakening of the cable’s insulation and the resultant earth fault.

Circuit Breaker Failure
The cable fault described above should have caused the 33kV circuit breaker in No.1 electrical sub-station to operate and clear the fault. However it failed to operate because its earth protection relay had been disabled by two small sections of plastic (cable ties with the ends cut-off) inserted in the connections between the relay and its current transformer. This meant that the earth fault protection relay was disabled and would not operate.

The power distribution failure had the potential to cause fatal injury and environmental impact, although no serious injury occurred, and there was only short term impact on the environment.

KEY ISSUES:
• Systems of work;
• The clarity and adequacy of instructions;
• The adequacy of supervision;
• Operatives behaviour;
• BP planning processes;
• Risk assessments carried out by the contractors;
• Details in the method statements;
• Inconsistent and different methods of application of the permit-to-work (PTW) system;
• Procedures, systems of work and test equipment for the testing of the 33kV circuit breaker;
• Implementation of maintenance policies.

Image Credit: HSE

Six people were killed and five others injured after a suspected explosion hit a hydropower plant in southwest China’s Yunnan Province on Friday.

The emergency management department of Yunnan said the accident happened at 11:10 a.m. at the Sinanjiang Hydropower Station in Mojiang County. It happened as workers were dredging the dam’s ventilation tunnel.

Authorities said the rescue operation had been completed and the injured were not in a life-threatening condition. An investigation has been launched into the cause of the accident

Image Credit: TN

A failure led to the release of light hydrocarbons that dispersed and found an ignition source. An intense fire followed in the tank farm. After less than five minutes, a 5,000-bbl storage sphere failed, resulting in a large fireball and rocketed pieces of the sphere throughout the plant. Within the next 20 minutes, five 1,000-bbl horizontal vessels, four 1,000 bbl vertical vessels, and one additional 5,000 bbl sphere failed, either as a result of missile damage or due to a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). Pieces of the tanks travelled in all directions, falling into operating units and tank farms, starting more fires. Fragments also hit the firewater storage tank and electric fire pumps, leaving only the two diesel fire pumps operational.

[ Property Damage $55 Million. Estimated Current Value $211 Million ]

Image credit: Valero

At approximately 11:00 PM on May 31, 2017, explosion(s) at the Didion Milling (Didion) facility in Cambria, Wisconsin, resulted in 5 worker deaths and an additional 14 workers injured. Because the event occurred at night, only 19 employees were working within the facility at the time of the incident.

Shortly before the explosion(s) at Didion, workers saw or smelled smoke on the first floor of one of the mill buildings. In trying to find its source, workers focused on a piece of equipment called a gap mill. While inspecting the equipment, workers witnessed a filter connected to an air intake line for the mill blow off, resulting in corn dust filling the air, and flames shooting from the air intake line, followed by one or more explosions..

KEY ISSUES:
• DUST HAZARD AWARENESS
• DUST LEVEL PERCEPTION

Image credit: CSB

A fire and subsequent explosion near the distillation unit on the refinery resulted in the whole site’s shutdown, which is expected to last up to 12 months.

At about 16:53 hours on Saturday 1 June 1974 the Nypro (UK) site at Flixborough was severely damaged by a large explosion. Twenty-eight workers were killed and a further 36 suffered injuries. It is recognised that the number of casualties would have been more if the incident had occurred on a weekday, as the main office block was not occupied. Offsite consequences resulted in fifty-three reported injuries. Property in the surrounding area was damaged to a varying degree.

Prior to the explosion, on 27 March 1974, it was discovered that a vertical crack in reactor No.5 was leaking cyclohexane. The plant was subsequently shutdown for an investigation. The investigation that followed identified a serious problem with the reactor and the decision was taken to remove it and install a bypass assembly to connect reactors No.4 and No.6 so that the plant could continue production.

During the late afternoon on 1 June 1974 a 20 inch bypass system ruptured, which may have been caused by a fire on a nearby 8 inch pipe. This resulted in the escape of a large quantity of cyclohexane. The cyclohexane formed a flammable mixture and subsequently found a source of ignition. At about 16:53 hours there was a massive vapour cloud explosion which caused extensive damage and started numerous fires on the site.

Eighteen fatalities occurred in the control room as a result of the windows shattering and the collapse of the roof. No one escaped from the control room. The fires burned for several days and after ten days those that still raged were hampering the rescue work.

KEY ISSUES:
• PLANT MODIFICATION / CHANGE PROCEDURES
• DESIGN CODES – PIPEWORK
• MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
• PLANT LAYOUT
• CONTROL ROOM DESIGN
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• INERTING

Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/13689/the-flixborough-disaster-report-of-the-court-of-inquiry_repaired.pdf

Image Credit: Scunthorpe Telegraph (George Schofield)

Shortly after 6pm, on 2 June 2011, an atmospheric storage tank within the amine regeneration unit at the Chevron Pembroke Refinery exploded. A fireball split the tank open and killed four workers: Robert Broome, Julie Jones, Dennis Riley and Andrew Jenkins. The sole survivor, Andrew Phillips, sustained severe burns and suffered life-changing injuries.

The force of the explosion ejected the five-tonne steel tank roof over 55 metres through the air. After narrowly missing a multi-fuel pipe track, the roof crashed onto a pressurised storage sphere containing extremely flammable butane. Good fortune prevented the airborne roof from puncturing the butane storage vessel, which would have led to an uncontrolled release of liquified petroleum gas (LPG).

The explosion was caused by the unintended ignition of a flammable atmosphere within the tank (17T302), during what should have been a routine cleaning operation conducted in preparation for maintenance.

KEY ISSUES:
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• PERMIT SYSTEM
• CONTROL OF CONTRACTORS
• RISK ASSESSMENT
• COMPETENCE

Image Credit: HSE

10 workers have now died following an explosion on 3 June, at a chemicals factory in India, reports news agency The Indian Express. Reportedly, more than 70 others were injured.

The blast occurred at a facility owned by specialty chemicals and intermediates company Yashashvi Rasayan, in an industrial area located in Dahej, in the Bharuch district of Gujarat, India. New Delhi Television (NDTV) reports that the ensuing fire engulfed the entire factory.

The Indian Express reports that at the time of the blast nearly 150 employees were inside the factory. Of the 77 injured workers admitted to hospitals for treatment, 33 have now been discharged. Two workers are in critical condition, according to M D Modia of the General Administration Department of the Gujarat Government.

Following the explosion – reportedly heard from 3 km away – around 4,800 people were evacuated from the nearby villages of Lahki and Luvara, says another report from The Indian Express. According to Times Now, Modia said this was due to the presence of poisonous chemicals. The Indian Express reports that it was as a precautionary measure. It is not noted whether residents have yet returned to their homes.

According to The Indian Express, the Gujarat Government issued a closure notice to Yashashvi Rasayan for the site where the incident took place, and additionally ordered an audit of all the factories in Dahej. The report added that according to an official release from Vipul Mittra of the Gujarat Government, “[t]he unit will not be allowed to resume operations, until adequate safety measures are in place”.

N D Vaghela, Assistant Director in the Office for Industrial Safety & Health, reportedly said that the blast occurred in a chemical tank and damaged others. Reportedly, officials are unable to enter the storage area for now.

The Indian Express reports that the cause of the blast is currently unknown, according to Vaghela. A previous report from The Indian Express said the explosion was caused by an unknown reaction between two containers, and reports from other outlets have referred to the explosion as a boiler blast.

Image Credit: Times of India

On the evening of June 3rd 2014 two major explosions and subsequently, a fire occurred at a Shell Moerdijk petrochemical plant. The explosions could be heard within a 20-kilometre radius. Debris from the explosion was found 800 metres away. Two employees were injured in the explosion. The Dutch Safety Board investigated this incident focusing on the immediate and underlying causes of the explosions. Besides that, also the firefighting and crisis management were investigated.

KEY ISSUES:
• Management of change is vital to identify new hazards
• Knowledge transfer between the design phase and the operations phase is critical

Image Credit: Dutch Safety Board

A gas release from a corroded pipeline resulted in an explosion at a gas plant. This resulted in a 30% reduction in the Australian state’s domestic gas supply and a 45% reduction in the supply of gas to mines and other industries. Workers were evacuated from the island as a precaution. It took six months before the plant was returned to full capacity operation.

[ Property Damage $120 Million. Estimated Current Value $143 Million ]

Image credit: WA News

A well-intervention vessel lost power and collided with an unmanned platform forming part of this 230,000 bbl per day complex. Heavy damage was caused to the vessel and the platform, including damage to the platform structure, linking access bridge, and well equipment. Some 23,000 bbl per day of oil production was reportedly affected. The force of the collision caused the bow of the vessel to compress by about two meters, with the platform pushed partly out of position, loosening several support legs from the main load-bearing structure. One of the water injection risers on the platform was bent extensively and several wellheads were moved, with a catalog of further damage from the collision also identified.

[ Property Damage $750 Million. Estimated Current Value $909 Million ]

Image credit: No credit

An explosion at the Partridge-Raleigh oilfield in Raleigh, Mississippi. The incident occurred at about 8:30 a.m. on June 5, 2006, when Stringer’s Oilfield Services contract workers were installing pipe from two production tanks to a third. Welding sparks ignited flammable vapor escaping from an open-ended pipe about four feet from the contractors’ welding activity on tank 4. The explosion killed three workers who were standing on top of tanks 3 and 4. A fourth worker was seriously injured.

KEY ISSUES:
• HOT WORK CONTROL
• SAFE WORK PRACTICES AT OIL & GAS PRODUCTION WELLS

ROOT CAUSES:
1. A gas detector was not used to test for flammable vapor.
2. ‘Flashing’ tanks containing hydrocarbons with a lit oxy-acetylene torch to determine the presence of flammable vapor is unsafe and extremely dangerous.
3. The open pipe on the adjacent tank was not capped or otherwise isolated.
4. A makeshift work platform – a ladder placed between the tanks – was used.
5. All tanks were interconnected and some of the tanks contained flammable residue and crude oil.

Image credit: CSB

Around 21,000 t of diesel has leaked into a Russian river near Norilsk, which is inside the Arctic circle, after a storage tank collapsed. It is believed that posts supporting the tank sank due to melting permafrost following unusually warm weather.

The spill occurred at a heat and power plant operated by Norilsk-Taymyr Energy Company (NTEC), a subsidiary of Norilsk Nickel, on 29 May. According to Norilsk Nickel, around 21,000 t of diesel leaked into the Ambarnaya river. The company said that supporting posts at the base of a storage tank suddenly sank. Sergey Dyachenko, First Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Norilsk Nickel, said: “We can assume that abnormally mild temperatures could have caused permafrost thawing resulting in partial subsidence of the tank’s supports.”

NTEC teams are currently assessing the risk of sinking soil under hazardous objects installed in permafrost. Dyachenko said that the tanks are inspected every second year so that negligence was not the cause of the collapse.

A fire also occurred on the site after a car came into contact with the leaked fuel, causing a fire around 300 m2 in area. The fire was contained and extinguished and the driver did not sustain any injuries.

Image Credit: Getty

A contractor died after entering a confined space at Dow Chemical’s plant in Oyster Creek.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Unidentified

An explosion and fire occurred at one of manufacturing plant’s process units at Eastman Chemical Resins in Jefferson Hills. The fire was extinguished about 2 h after it began. Shelter-in-place order was issued

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Unidentified

An 18″ medium pressure (MP) steam main located near to the A904 Bo’ness road ruptured at 23:18 p.m. on 7th June 2000 resulting in a significant loss of MP steam directly into the atmosphere. The steam leak damaged fencing immediately adjacent to the ruptured pipework. Debris and steam was blown across the road until the leak was isolated. The leak also caused significant noise (similar to a jet engine) being heard in the Grangemouth area. A member of the public walking the dog 300 metres away sustained rib injuries from tripping over the dog.

There was significant disruption to the steam supply system for the Complex for approximately one hour until the steam leak could be isolated and as a result of the incident the A904 Bo’ness road was closed for public access until 22nd June whilst repairs were carried out.

The medium pressure (MP) steam main rupture had the potential to cause fatal injury and environmental impact, although no serious injury occurred, and there was only short term impact on the environment.

The critical factors that led to the incident were created a week earlier. Significant levels of condensate built up in the steam line following isolation of a steam trap to gain access for inspection of the tunnel, after the culvert was flooded following the power distribution failure.

The immediate cause of the catastrophic failure of an MP steam distribution pipeline was “condensation induced water hammer” which caused gross overpressure.

KEY ISSUES:
• Management of change (change control procedures);
• Failure to adequately investigate significant plant upsets and to carry out risk assessments;
• Operating regimes and lack of certain site standards;
• Inspection and maintenance of equipment;
• Management structure and organisation;
• Failure to learn lessons from previous incidents/events on-site.

Image Credit: HSE

On June 7, 2010, at 2:40 p.m., a truck-mounted power auger (auger truck) operated by C&H Power Line Construction (C&H) struck and punctured a 36-inch-diameter natural gas transmission pipeline operated by Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise). C&H, a contractor working for Brazos Electric (Brazos), was using the auger truck to dig holes for the installation of new electric service utility poles.

The accident occurred about 45 miles southwest of Fort Worth, Texas, near the town of Cleburne. The natural gas ignited and killed the auger operator and burned six workers, who were transported to a nearby hospital for treatment. The pipeline had a maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) of 1,051 pounds per square inch, gauge (psig) and was operating at 950 psig at the time of the accident. Total property damage and clean-up costs were estimated to be $1,029,000.

Fire and explosions occurred at the Miller Chemical and Fertilizer Complex, which blended raw materials to manufacture agricultural products

Damage to the facility: $20 million dollars/Shelter-inplace within a mile radius of the warehouse

Proximate causes:
• Defective equipment

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: 911 Photography

There was a chemical leak in a cracking unit at Dow Chemical’s Oyster Creek Plant. In this incident the release did not result in a fire. Nearby residents and employees were asked to stay indoors

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Dow