Impact HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)
Audits & Reviews
Commitment & Culture
Compliance with Standards
Control of Work
Management of Change
MONITORING & IMPROVEMENT
PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Food & Drink
Onshore Oil & Gas
Plastics & Polymers
Pulp & Paper
Papua New Guinea
Fluid release to ground
Fluid release to water
Gas/vapour/mist/etc release to air
Rapid phase-transition explosion
Runaway reaction explosion
Solid release to air
Solid release to ground
Solid release to water
Design of Plant
Loss of Process Control
Physical Security Breach
COST (On Site)
ENVIRONMENTAL (On Site)
HUMAN (Offsite At Risk)
HUMAN (Offsite Fatalities)
HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)
HUMAN (On Site At Risk)
HUMAN (On Site Fatalities)
HUMAN (On Site Injuries)
> 100 Fatalities
< 100 Injuries
11 - 100 Fatalities
11 – 100 Fatalities
≥ 100 Injuries
PSV – Pilot Operated
Safety & Control
Shell & Tube
Valves - Safety
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
Oil based solvent
Urea Ammonium Nitrate
Vinyl Chloride Monomer
Live Event Type
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Dust Safety Science
Dutch Safety Board
New Zealand Government
Process Safety Integrity
Step Change in Safety
Corrosion Under Insulation
High Pressure Water
Loss of Utilities
Low Temperature Embrittlement
Normalization of Deviance
Safe Operating Limits
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Permit To Work
Learning from Incidents
Floating Roof Tanks
Minute To Learn
Safety Critical Decisions
202312NovAll DayAllied Terminals Tank Collapse 2008Allied Terminals Chesapeake (US-VA)Lessons:Asset integrity,Compliance with Standards,Management of ChangeIndustry:StorageCountry:United StatesLanguage:ENLoC:Deficiency Origin: CSB Incident:Fluid release to waterHazards:OxidisingContributory Factors:Containment FailureImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Urea Ammonium Nitrate
On November 12, 2008, a 2-million-gallon liquid fertilizer tank (designated as Tank 201 by the owner) catastrophically failed at the Allied Terminals, Inc. (Allied) facility in Chesapeake, Virginia, seriously injuring
On November 12, 2008, a 2-million-gallon liquid fertilizer tank (designated as Tank 201 by the owner) catastrophically failed at the Allied Terminals, Inc. (Allied) facility in Chesapeake, Virginia, seriously injuring two workers and partially flooding an adjacent residential neighborhood.
On the day of the incident, Allied was filling Tank 201 with liquid fertilizer to check for leaks prior to painting the tank. During the filling, a welder and his helper sealed leaking rivets on the tank.
At a fill level about 3.5 inches below the calculated maximum liquid level, the tank split apart vertically, beginning at a defective weld located midway up the tank. Within seconds, the liquid fertilizer overtopped the secondary containment, partially flooding the site and adjacent neighborhood. The collapsing tank wall injured the welder and his helper, who were working on the tank. Employees of a neighboring business responded and extricated them. At least 200,000 gallons of the liquid fertilizer were not recovered; some entered the southern branch of the Elizabeth River.
• LIQUID FERTILIZER STORAGE TANK STANDARDS
• TANK MODIFICATION FOR CHANGE-IN-SERVICE
• TANK INSPECTION
1. Allied did not ensure that welds on the plates to replace the vertical riveted joints met generally accepted industry quality standards for tank fabrication.
2. Allied had not performed post-welding inspection (spot radiography) required for the calculated maximum liquid level for the tank.
3. Allied had no safety procedures or policies for work on or around tanks that were being filled for the first time following major modifications and directed contractors to seal leaking rivets while Tank 201 was being filled to the calculated maximum liquid level for the first time.
Image credit: CSB
202317NovAll DayDPC Enterprises (Glendale) Toxic Release 2003DPC Enterprises Glendale (US-AZ)Lessons:Asset integrity,Emergency Preparedness,Operating Procedures,Risk Assessment,Stakeholder EngagementIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:United StatesLanguage:ENLoC:Overpressure Origin: CSB Incident:Gas/vapour/mist/etc release to airHazards:Environmental,Oxidising,ToxicContributory Factors:Organized ProceduresImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Chlorine
At about 11:30 a.m. on November 17, 2003, an uncontrolled decomposition reaction in a batch scrubber released chlorine gas into the air at the DPC Enterprises, L.P. (DPC) chlorine repackaging
At about 11:30 a.m. on November 17, 2003, an uncontrolled decomposition reaction in a batch scrubber released chlorine gas into the air at the DPC Enterprises, L.P. (DPC) chlorine repackaging facility in Glendale, Arizona. Hazardous emissions continued for about six hours. Residents and workers in a 1.5 square mile zone were told to evacuate, and 11 police officers and five members of the community sought medical treatment for exposure to chlorine.
• MATCHING SAFEGUARDS TO RISK
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• REACTIVE HAZARDS
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE
1. Corporate standards relied solely on procedural safeguards against scrubber over-chlorination.
2. Corporate hazard assessment process did not identify or address the consequences of failure to follow the bleach manufacturing SOP, including potential off-site consequences.
3. Internal PSM/RMP audit program did not detect deficiencies in operating procedures, training, operating practice, process safety information, and hazard assessment.
Image Credit: CSB
202322NovAll DayCAI / Arnel Explosion 2006CAI/Arnel Danvers (US-MA)Lessons:Compliance with Standards,Operating ProceduresIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:United StatesLanguage:ENLoC:Operator error Origin: CSB Incident:VCEHazards:FlammableContributory Factors:ErrorImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Hydrocarbons
On November 22, 2006, at about 2:45 am, a violent explosion at the CAI/Arnel manufacturing facility rocked the town of Danvers, MA. The explosion and subsequent fire destroyed the facility,
On November 22, 2006, at about 2:45 am, a violent explosion at the CAI/Arnel manufacturing facility rocked the town of Danvers, MA. The explosion and subsequent fire destroyed the facility, heavily damaged dozens of nearby homes and businesses, and shattered windows as far away as two miles. At least 10 residents required hospital treatment for cuts and bruises. Twenty-four homes and six businesses were damaged beyond repair. Dozens of boats at the nearby marina were heavily damaged by blast overpressure and debris strikes.
The fire department ordered the evacuation of more than 300 residents within a half-mile radius of the facility. Numerous residents could not return for many months while they waited for their houses to be rebuilt or repaired. Seventeen months after the explosion, six homes had yet to be reoccupied as repairs were not complete..
• SAFE HANDLING OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS
• FIRE CODE COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT
• STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAZARDOUS FACILITY LICENSING
1. CAI management did not conduct a process hazards analysis or similar systematic review of processes involving hazardous materials.
2. CAI management did not use written procedures or checklists to facilitate safe process operations.
Image credit: CSB
202303DecAll DayMarcus Oil & Chemical Explosion 2004Marcus Oil and Chemical Houston (US-TX) Lessons:Asset integrity,Operating ProceduresIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:United StatesLanguage:ENLoC:Deficiency Origin: CSB Incident:VCEHazards:FlammableContributory Factors:Containment FailureImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Polyethylene
An explosion and fire that occurred in a polyethylene wax processing facility operated by Marcus Oil and Chemical on the southwest side of Houston, Texas. On Friday, December 3, 2004,
An explosion and fire that occurred in a polyethylene wax processing facility operated by Marcus Oil and Chemical on the southwest side of Houston, Texas. On Friday, December 3, 2004, at about 5:50 pm, employees heard a loud “pop” then saw light from a fire reflecting off a shiny tanker truck parked near the process equipment. About 45 seconds later, a violent explosion occurred and a fire fueled by molten wax erupted near the main warehouse. The warehouse and nearby equipment were quickly involved in the fire.
The Houston Fire Department arrived approximately five minutes after the explosion. Firefighters extinguished the three-alarm blaze by midnight, approximately seven hours after the explosion.
Three firefighters were slightly injured while fighting the fire, and local residents sustained minor injuries from flying glass. The explosion shattered windows in buildings and vehicles and caused structural damage as far as one-quarter mile away. Significant interior damage resulted when suspended ceilings and light fixtures were blown down in the onsite buildings, nearby businesses, and a church. Tank 7, a 12-foot diameter, 50-foot long, 50,000-pound pressure vessel was propelled 150 feet where it impacted a warehouse belonging to another business..
• PRESSURE VESSEL REPAIRS & ALTERATIONS
• NITROGEN INERTING SYSTEM DESIGN & OPERATION
1. Poor welding severely weakened Tank 7 and led to its catastrophic failure.
2. The connection between the nitrogen and the compressed air systems increased the oxygen concentration in the inerting gas to an unsafe level.
3. Pressure vessels had operating pressures in excess of 100 psig, yet none was equipped with a pressure relief device.
Image Credit: CSB
202307DecAll DayInternational Biosynthetics Toxic Release 1991International Biosynthetics Widnes (GB)Lessons:Asset integrity,Operational Integrity,Risk AssessmentIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:United KingdomLanguage:ENLoC:Genuine release Origin: HSE Incident:Gas/vapour/mist/etc release to airHazards:ToxicImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:PhosgeneTopics:Chemical Reaction
The International Biosynthetics (IBIS) plant was, at the time of the accident, a wholly owned subsidiary of Shell UK Ltd. and employed some 250 people in the manufacture of fine
The International Biosynthetics (IBIS) plant was, at the time of the accident, a wholly owned subsidiary of Shell UK Ltd. and employed some 250 people in the manufacture of fine chemicals.
The release occurred on the phosgene plant at 11:27 hours on 7 December 1991. The batch reaction involved the phosgenation of dimethyl aniline (DMA) in a toluene solution. The process involved the addition of 1 tonne of recycled toluene to the reactor, then as no more recycled toluene was available fresh toluene was to be added. Attempts were made to fill the reactor with 2 tonnes of fresh toluene. The flow indicator showed that the required amount of toluene had been added to the reactor, however a control valve between the pump and the vessel was closed and none of the toluene had been added. A level measurement was available for the vessel but as the process appeared to be proceeding normally this was not checked.
The next stage was to add 20 kg of phosgene to check if any water was present in the reactor. This would have resulted in a temperature rise of the solution. Because there was insufficient toluene in the vessel, the temperature indicator was not in the solution and therefore showed no temperature rise. As there appeared to be no water in the reactor, 0.8 tonnes of phosgene were then added to the vessel. After a shift changeover the next steps in the process were carried out. These were to add 1.6 tonnes of DMA and heat to 65°C. The operating temperature was reached but the temperature continued to rise to well above 100°C. As the pressure increased the pressure control valve, pressure relief valve and bursting disc all operated as designed and relieved the vessel to a scrubbing column. The reaction was more violent than had been predicted and the relief system had insufficient capacity to deal with the pressure rise. This resulted in a connection on the condenser line failing and releasing the contents of the vessel to atmosphere. Fortunately the phosgene had been consumed in the reaction. However, the vapour cloud drifted for 4 km affecting about 60 people and staining some property blue.
• CONTROL SYSTEMS
• REACTION / PRODUCT TESTING
• RELIEF SYSTEMS / VENT SYSTEMS
Image Credit: HSE
202311DecAll DayBuncefield Explosion 2005Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd (GB)Lessons:Asset integrity,Commitment & Culture,Compliance with Standards,Management of Change,Operating Procedures,Risk Assessment,Stakeholder EngagementIndustry:StorageCountry:United KingdomLanguage:ENLoC:Component malfunction Origin: HSE Incident:VCEHazards:FlammableContributory Factors:Component MalfunctionImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Petroleum/GasolineTopics:Functional Safety,LOPA
In the early hours of Sunday 11th December 2005, a number of explosions occurred at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire. At least one of the initial explosions was
In the early hours of Sunday 11th December 2005, a number of explosions occurred at Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire. At least one of the initial explosions was of massive proportions and there was a large fire, which engulfed a high proportion of the site.
Over 40 people were injured; fortunately there were no fatalities. Significant damage occurred to both commercial and residential properties in the vicinity and a large area around the site was evacuated on emergency service advice. The fire burned for several days, destroying most of the site and emitting large clouds of black smoke into the atmosphere.
• SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
• PROTECTING AGAINST LOSS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
• ENGINEERING AGAINST ESCALATION OF LOSS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT
• ENGINEERING AGAINST THE LOSS OF SECONDARY AND TERTIARY CONTAINMENT
• OPERATING WITH HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS
• DELIVERING HIGH PERFORMANCE THROUGH CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP
MIIB Final Report Vol 1: https://www.icheme.org/media/13707/buncefield-miib-final-report-volume-1.pdf
MIIB Final Report Vol 2a: https://www.icheme.org/media/13923/buncefield-miib-final-report-volume-2a.pdf
MIIB Final Report Vol 3a: https://www.icheme.org/media/13923/buncefield-miib-final-report-volume-2a.pdf
Land Use Planning – Recommendations: https://www.icheme.org/media/10694/recommendations-on-land-use-planning.pdf
Land Use Planning – Model: https://www.icheme.org/media/13709/illustrative-model-of-a-risk-based-lup-system_repaired.pdf
Explosion Mechanism: https://www.icheme.org/media/10696/buncefield-explosion-mechanism-advisory-group-report.pdf
BSTG Final Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/10697/safety-and-environmental-standards-for-fuel-storage-sites.pdf
Emergency Preparedness: https://www.icheme.org/media/10698/recommendations-on-emergency-preparedness.pdf
Design & Operation: https://www.icheme.org/media/10699/recommendations-on-the-design-and-operation-of-fuel-storage-sites.pdf
Initial Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/10700/buncefield-initial-report.pdf
Investigation – Progress Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/10705/buncefield-first-progress-report.pdf
Investigation – 2nd Progress Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/10703/buncefield-second-progress-report.pdf
Investigation – 3rd Progress Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/10702/buncefield-third-progress-report.pdf
Why did it happen?: https://www.icheme.org/media/10706/buncefield-report.pdf
Image Credit: Hertfordshire County Council
202404JanAll DayBraehead Container Depot Fire 1977Renfrew (GB)Industry:WarehouseCountry:United KingdomLanguage:ENLoC:Fire exposure Origin: HSE Incident:FIREHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Various
On 4 January 1977, a serious fire and explosion occurred at the Braehead Container Clearance Depot at Renfrew in Scotland. The fire and explosion, which originated at a warehouse occupied by
On 4 January 1977, a serious fire and explosion occurred at the Braehead Container Clearance Depot at Renfrew in Scotland.
The fire and explosion, which originated at a warehouse occupied by James Kelman Transport and Storage, completely wrecked that warehouse and the adjacent whisky bonded warehouse occupied by Clyde Container Services Ltd and also caused widespread window and roof damage to domestic, commercial, industrial and public property within a radius of a mile of the premises. The cost of the damage is estimated at some £6 000 000.
It was fortunate that, despite the extent of the damage, only twelve members of the public and one watchman were treated for shock and minor injuries. After investigation had eliminated one cause of fire after another it was discovered that it had accidently been started by three boys who had lit a fire to warm themselves at a den which they had made, during the New Year holiday, from cardboard cartons stacked beside the warehouse.
Subsequent experimental work tended to suggest that explosions of this nature and severity can be caused by the involvement of commercially pure sodium chlorate under the intense heat conditions of an industrial fire.
Image Credit: HSE
202409JanAll DayFreedom Industries Toxic Release 2014Freedom Industries Charleston (US-WV)Lessons:Asset integrity,Compliance with Standards,Emergency PreparednessIndustry:StorageCountry:United StatesLanguage:ENLoC:Deterioration Origin: CSB Incident:Fluid release to waterHazards:Harmful/IrritantContributory Factors:Containment FailureImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:≥ 100 InjuriesMaterial:MCHM
On January 9, 2014, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) inspectors arrived at the Freedom Industries (Freedom) chemical storage and distribution facility in Charleston, West Virginia, in response to
On January 9, 2014, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP) inspectors arrived at the Freedom Industries (Freedom) chemical storage and distribution facility in Charleston, West Virginia, in response to complaints from the public about a chemical odor. Upon arrival, WVDEP inspectors discovered a chemical leaking from tank 396, an aboveground storage tank (AST). The leaking tank contents were originally reported as crude methylcychohexanemethanol (MCHM), but 13 days later Freedom reported it was a mixture of Crude MCHM and polyglycol ethers (PPH, stripped) called Shurflot 944.5 The chemical mixture escaped tank 396 through two small holes on the tank floor and traveled down a descending bank into the adjacent Elk River. The holes were caused by pitting corrosion that initiated on the internal surface of the tank floor. The tank contents drained into the gravel and soil surrounding tank 396 and found multiple pathways into the river. The secondary containment or dike wall, originally designed to control leaks, had cracks and holes from disrepair that allowed the mixture, containing Crude MCHM and PPH, stripped, to escape the containment. The leak also found a pathway to the river through a subsurface culvert, located under adjacent ASTs.
After prompting by WVDEP, Freedom took action to stop the leak and prevent further contamination by deploying services to recover the spill and vacuum the remaining tank contents. However, nearly 11,000 gallons of a mixture containing Crude MCHM and PPH, stripped had already entered into the surrounding soil and Elk River. Once in the river, it flowed downstream to the intake of the West Virginia American Water (WVAW) water treatment facility, about 1.5 miles downriver from Freedom. WVAW’s water treatment and filtration methods were unable to treat and remove all of the chemical mixture in its water treatment process and as a result, it contaminated the drinking water within WVAW’s distribution system. That evening, WVAW issued a Do Not Use (DNU) order for 93,000 customer accounts (approximately 300,000 residents) across portions of nine counties.
• TANK INSPECTIONS & MAINTENANCE
• RISK COMMUNICATION
• PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS SAFETY & RISK ASSESSMENT
• TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
1. Corrosion of primary containment
2. Deteriorated secondary containment
Image credit: CSB
202401FebAll DayAssociated Octel Fire 1994Associated Octel Ellesmere Port (GB)Lessons:Asset integrity,Control of Work,Operational IntegrityIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:United KingdomLanguage:ENLoC:Deterioration Origin: HSE Incident:Jet flameHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Ethyl chloride
At about 8.23 pm on 1 February 1994 there was a release of reactor solution from a recirculating pump near the base of a 25 tonne ethyl chloride (EC) reactor
At about 8.23 pm on 1 February 1994 there was a release of reactor solution from a recirculating pump near the base of a 25 tonne ethyl chloride (EC) reactor vessel at the factory of The Associated Octel Company Ltd, Ellesmere Port, Cheshire. The reactor solution was highly flammable, corrosive and toxic, mainly consisting of ethyl chloride, a liquefied flammable gas, mixed with hydrogen chloride a toxic and corrosive gas, and small quantities of solid catalyst, aluminium chloride. A dense, white cloud soon enveloped the plant and began to move off-site.
The on-site and external emergency services were called in accordance with pre-arranged procedures for major incidents involving chemical release. Over the next one and a half hours action was taken to isolate the leak, to suppress the further release of vapour and to prevent the cloud spreading.
In spite of these attempts a pool of liquid continued to collect and at 10.08 pm the flammable vapours of ethyl chloride ignited, causing a major pool fire which was most intense at the base of the reactor. As the incident developed there were also fires at flanges damaged in the fire, including jet flames at the top of two large process vessels on the plant. Although these vessels and the reactor were protected by a fire resistant coating, there was concern at one stage that the vessels might explode and the damage extend to chlorine storage vessels on the adjacent plant.
The leak occurred at a point between fixed pipework and the discharge port of a pump recirculating liquids to the reactor, as a direct consequence of either (a) the failure of a corroded securing flange on the pump working loose; or (b) the failure of a PTFE flexible connection (‘bellows’) connecting the pump discharge to the pipe. The HSE believes the first of these possible causes was the more likely. The most likely source of ignition was an electrical control box to a compressor nearby.
• CORROSION / SELECTION OF MATERIALS
• DESIGN CODES – PIPEWORK
• MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
Image Credit: HSE
202412FebAll DaySIMAR TOXIC RELEASE 2015Simar, Igualad (ES)Lessons:Audits & Reviews,Competency,Control of Work,Emergency Preparedness,Operating Procedures,Operational Integrity,Process Knowledge,Risk Assessment,Stakeholder Engagement,Workforce InvolvementIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:SpainLanguage:ENLoC:Operator error Origin: MKOPSC Incident:Runaway reaction explosionImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 Injuries
Employees at the plant were carrying out their normal duties when two chemical compounds came into contact. An explosion occurred releasing a toxic cloud into the air. Toxic cloud Source:
Employees at the plant were carrying out their normal duties when two chemical compounds came into contact. An explosion occurred releasing a toxic cloud into the air. Toxic cloud
Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Reuters
202416FebAll DayCSX (KANAWHA) EXPLOSION 2015CSX Transportation, Kanawha (US-WV)Lessons:Asset integrity,Audits & Reviews,Competency,Compliance with Standards,Contractor Management,Management of Change,Operating Procedures,Performance Indicators,Risk Assessment,Workforce InvolvementIndustry:RailCountry:United StatesLanguage:ENLoC:Transport Origin: MKOPSC Incident:FireballHazards:FlammableContributory Factors:Organized ProceduresImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Crude Oil
A rail car with more than 100 tanks of crude bakken oil derailed in West Virginia, generating a huge fireball, the evacuation of hundreds of people and, a spill into
A rail car with more than 100 tanks of crude bakken oil derailed in West Virginia, generating a huge fireball, the evacuation of hundreds of people and, a spill into the Kanawha River.
Hundreds evacuated – FRE issued CSX and Sperry Rail Service $25.000 fines each
• Inadequate tools, equipment & vehicles (rail defect)
Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: US Coast Guard
202420MarAll DayNiigata Explosion 2007Shin-Etsu Niigata (JP)Industry:ChemicalsCountry:JapanLanguage:ENLoC:Confined explosion Origin: Marsh Incident:Dust explosionHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)Effects:< 100 InjuriesMaterial:Methylcellulose
An accident occurred at a methylcellulose manufacturing facility. An explosion occurred and was followed by a fire, which was extinguished about seven hours later. A total of 17 people working
An accident occurred at a methylcellulose manufacturing facility. An explosion occurred and was followed by a fire, which was extinguished about seven hours later. A total of 17 people working at the site were injured in this accident; three critically, five seriously, and nine with minor injuries. There was one minor injury off site. Ignition of the methylcellulose powder is though to have been due to static electricity, resulting in a powder dust explosion. All methylcellulose operations were suspended for two months before sequentially restarting.
[ Property Damage $240 Million. Estimated Current Value $306 Million ]
Image credit: Shin-Etsu