Hazards: Mechanical/Kinetic/Potential

At about 1.25 am on the fourth of November 1975 the foreman at the Queen Victoria Blast Furnace, Appleby-Frodingham Works started a cast that was intended to fill two torpedo ladles. Conditions at the time were normal; the shift manager was in attendance.

Shortly before 2.00 am some 175 tonnes of metal had been run into the first torpedo and the iron stream diverted to the second ladle. Some 10 to 15 minutes later the blow pipe at the No. 3 tuyere position started to burn down on the side facing on to No. 2 tuyere hearth cooler. The burning developed rapidly with intense flame and sparks despite efforts by the furnace keeper to cool the pipe by spraying it with water.

Whilst the pipe was burning down, a substantial water leak from the furnace or fittings was observed. The source of the leak could not be identified because the face of the furnace was obscured by flame. For the same reason men could not approach the leak to take remedial action. The leak of water was under pressure and fell outwards from the furnace towards the edge of the hob; from the hob the water ran down the slope of the cast house floor joining eventually with the iron runnel Water entered the full torpedo ladle.

Within a few minutes of the blow pipe starting to burn down progressive action was being taken by the furnace crew to bring the furnace off blast so that a new pipe could be fitted.

Shortly before 2.47 am instructions from the shift manager were passed via Traffic Control to a loco driver and shunter to remove the full torpedo ladle from the vicinity of the furnace. Traffic personnel were made aware that water was running into the torpedo. As the loco was coupled to the ladle, water was seen to be coming from the iron runner. An explosion occurred as the ladle was moved. An eye witness identified the throat of the ladle as the seat of the explosion. The incident was timed at 2.47 am.

As a result of the explosion there were four immediate fatalities and 15 hospital admissions. Subsequently a further seven employees died as a result of injuries received.

At the time of the explosion 23 persons were working in the Queen Victoria furnace area. This number included four extra helpers standing by to assist in changing No. 3 blast pipe. Casting to the second torpedo was sti11 proceeding at the time of the explosion.

Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/13691/the-explosion-at-appleby-frodingham-steelworks-scunthorpe.pdf

Image Credit: HSE

At the premises of Corus UK Ltd, Port Talbot, No. 5 Blast Furnace exploded at approximately 17.13 pm on 8 November 2001. The entire furnace, which with its contents weighed approximately 5000 tonnes, lifted bodily at the lap joint, rising some 0.75 m from its supporting structures, leading to the explosive release of hot materials (an estimated 200 tonnes in total, comprising largely solids and semisolids, with a little molten metal) and gases into the cast house.

Three employees died: Andrew Hutin, Stephen Galsworthy and Len Radford. A further 12 employees and contractors sustained severe injuries. Many more suffered minor injuries and shock.

Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/10689/the-explosion-of-no-5-blast-furnace-corus-uk-ltd-port-talbot.pdf

Image Credit: HSE

On December 7, 2009, at approximately 2:30 pm, State Special Vessel No. 2, under an operating pressure of 29,000 psig, suddenly and violently ruptured, 120 days into a 150-day operating cycle. A white cloud of steam and debris rapidly expanded outward from the facility, traveled onto the interstate, and dissipated within seconds.

The sudden release of superheated liquid caused an eight-foot tall by four-foot wide vessel fragment, weighing approximately 8,600 pounds, to travel through two concrete walls and finally land about 435 feet from the NDK building. The fragment skipped across a neighboring facility parking lot and slammed into the wall of an adjacent business office. The force of the impact pushed the wall inward causing furniture to shift and ceiling tiles to fall. One person working near the wall was injured.

The thrust from the escaping liquid caused the base of the vessel to violently shear away from its foundation and blew pieces of structural steel out of the building into the parking lot of a nearby rest stop gas station, known as the Illinois Tollway (I-90) Oasis. One piece of structural steel struck and killed a truck driver at the rest stop. After shearing from its base and throwing shrapnel out of the facility, the vessel swung from the building and landed on the ground outside.

KEY ISSUES:
• PRESSURE VESSEL DESIGN & MATERIAL SELECTION REQUIREMENTS
• LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS INCIDENTS
• INSPECTIONS

ROOT CAUSES:
1. Stress corrosion cracking.
2. Testing & inspection deficiencies.

Image credit: CSB

In a chemical plant that produces fertilizer, carbon dioxide and dry ice, a pipeline explosion occurred.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Creston News Advertiser

An anchor-handling tug operating around an offshore field lost control and drifted over a subsea center. The anchor wires snagged the subsea equipment, causing damage to a Christmas tree, well conductor, and subsea control module. The remedial actions required included the plugging and abandonment of one well and the drilling of a replacement well.

[ Property Damage $120 Million. Estimated Current Value $145 Million ]

Image credit: No credit

The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was a fatal incident in the United States space program that occurred on Tuesday, January 28, 1986, when the Space Shuttle Challenger (OV-099) broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members aboard. The crew consisted of five NASA astronauts, one payload specialist, and a civilian schoolteacher. The mission carried the designation STS-51-L and was the tenth flight for the Challenger orbiter.

The spacecraft disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 11:39 a.m. EST (16:39 UTC). The disintegration of the vehicle began after a joint in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed at liftoff. The failure was caused by the failure of O-ring seals used in the joint that were not designed to handle the unusually cold conditions that existed at this launch. The seals’ failure caused a breach in the SRB joint, allowing pressurized burning gas from within the solid rocket motor to reach the outside and impinge upon the adjacent SRB aft field joint attachment hardware and external fuel tank. This led to the separation of the right-hand SRB’s aft field joint attachment and the structural failure of the external tank. Aerodynamic forces broke up the orbiter.

Image Credit: NASA