Hazards: Explosive

An explosion occurred due to an overflow of a slurry mixing tank, containing potassium sulfide, potassium dihydrogen phosphate, and MAP.

Proximate causes:
• Inadequate training/knowledge transfer (Lack of understanding the process);
• Lack of work rules/policies/ standards/procedures (wrong procedures for inspections);
• Inadequate work rules plan (lack of the pre-start safety review before inspection).

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)

On 21 March 2019, a major explosion occurred at a chemical plant in Chenjiagang Chemical Industry Park, Chenjiagang, Xiangshui County, Yancheng, Jiangsu, China. According to reports published on March 25, 78 people were killed and 617 injured.

The State Council of China officially recognized the severity of the accident, often referred to as “3.21 Explosive Accident”.

The explosion occurred at a local time of 14:48 (06:48 GMT). 78 people were killed, and at least 94 were severely injured, 32 of whom were critically injured. Around 640 people required hospital treatment and were taken to 16 hospitals. The injured included children at a local kindergarten. CENC detected an ML2.2 artificial earthquake whose epicenter is at 34.331°N 119.724°E.

The force of the blast started numerous fires in Yancheng, knocked down several buildings, and reportedly destroyed windows several kilometers away. The fire was reported to have been controlled by 03:00 local time. Considerable damage was caused to nearby factories and offices; the roof of Henglida Chemical Factory, 3 km from the explosion, fell in. At least one of the people killed was in another building destroyed by the blast. Windows are reported to have been blown out up to 6 km away from the explosion, and houses and other buildings were damaged in the nearby village-level administrative divisions including Hai’an Town (Haianju) (海安社区) and Shadang (沙荡社区). This explosion was strong enough that it registered on earthquake sensors and could be seen by satellites. The blast created a crater resulting in a magnitude 2.2 seismic shock that took over 900 firefighters to get the fire under control.

Ref: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Xiangshui_chemical_plant_explosion
Image Credit: Reuters

At 09.45 on 22 March 1989 a vehicle carrying approximately 800 kg of mixed explosives exploded at the premises of Vibroplant Ltd on the Fengate Industrial Estate, Peterborough. The explosion caused the death of a fireman and injuries to at least 107 other people, 84 of whom received hospital treatment. Two of the injured were admitted to intensive care.

The vehicle was a standard commercial model specially modified to carry explosives, operated by Nobels Explosives Company (NEC), a subsidiary of ICI. It had entered the Vibroplant yard, in order to turn round off the road, when a minor explosion occurred inside the load compartment, causing a fire. The fire brigade was called and took up position. The fire increased and after approximately 12 minutes the entire load, apart from a small number of detonators, detonated en masse.

The vehicle did not carry any external placarding to tell emergency services that it contained explosives, but this did not contravene the legislation in force at the time. The fire brigade was told that the vehicle was carrying commercial explosives before firemen arrived on the scene.

Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/13701/the-peterborough-explosion.pdf

Image Credit: HSE

A major explosion in a firecracker unit occurred. The unit was run illegally by the owner who was later taken under custody. Explosions in firecracker units have been a prevalent problem in the state of Seemandhra, India which needs to be addressed.

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: PTI

On April 8, 2011, at approximately 8:50 am, an explosion and fire occurred at a magazine known as ‘A-21’ located at Waikele Self Storage in Waipahu, Hawaii. Five Donaldson Enterprises, Inc. (DEI) employees were fatally injured and a sixth sustained minor injuries.

DEI, a small unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance company based on the island of Oahu, was using the magazine to store seized contraband fireworks and prepare them for disposal. On the morning of the incident, five DEI personnel were disassembling one-inch contraband firework tubes on a cement loading dock located directly in front of the magazine entrance, while a sixth remained inside the magazine cleaning and organizing . To accomplish the disassembly work, DEI personnel cut into the individual firework tubes by hand using a PVC pipe cutter or knife and separated the individual explosive components contained within each tube, the aerial shells and the black powder (which functions as a lift charge) into cardboard boxes.

According to witness statements, around 8:30 am it began to rain heavily, and the DEI workers quickly moved materials involved in the disassembly process – including tools, chairs, and boxes containing aerial shells, black powder, and partially disassembled firework tubes – to just inside the magazine entrance. While five of the workers remained inside, the project supervisor went outside to the front left corner of the loading dock to make a phone call. While he was on the phone, an explosion occurred inside the magazine, and a fire ensued.

The five individuals located inside the magazine at the time of the incident did not survive. Three DEI employees sustained fatal burn injuries while two succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. The project supervisor sustained minor injuries.

KEY ISSUES:
• HAZARDS OF FIREWORKS DISPOSAL & THE ACCUMULATION OF EXPLOSIVE FIREWORKS COMPONENTS
• LACK OF REGULATIONS & INDUSTRY STANDARDS ADDRESSING FIREWORKS DISPOSAL
• INSUFFICIENT CONTRACTOR SELECTION & OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS FOR HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES

ROOT CAUSES:
1. DEI’s hazard analysis of its fireworks disposal process was insufficient. The company failed to identify key hazards of handling, disassembling, and storing contraband commercial display fireworks, and did not adequately control the identified and evaluated hazards.
2. DEI personnel disposing of the fireworks lacked the training, experience, and knowledge of procedural safeguards for the safe conduct of the fireworks disposal.
3. DEI’s modifications to the fireworks disposal process accumulated substantially large quantities of explosive material in boxes, greatly increasing the potential explosion hazard. This change to the disposal process was not adequately reviewed for safety implications.

Image & AcciMap Credit: CSB

Image credit: CSB

The Texas City disaster was an industrial accident that occurred April 16, 1947, in the Port of Texas City, Texas, at Galveston Bay. It was the deadliest industrial accident in U.S. history, and one of history’s largest non-nuclear explosions.

A mid-morning fire started on board the French-registered vessel SS Grandcamp (docked in the port), and detonated her cargo of approximately 2,200 tons (approximately 2,100 metric tons) of ammonium nitrate. This started a chain reaction of additional fires and explosions in other ships and nearby oil-storage facilities. The events killed a total of at least 581 people, including all but one member of the Texas City fire department.

The disaster triggered the first-ever class action lawsuit against the United States government, under the recently enacted Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), on behalf of 8,485 victims.

Image Credit: Carl E Linde / AP

On April 17, 2013, a fire and explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Company (WFC), a fertilizer blending, retail, and distribution facility in West, Texas. The violent detonation fatally injured 12 emergency responders and three members of the public. Local hospitals treated more than 260 injured victims, many of whom required hospital admission. The blast completely destroyed the WFC facility and caused widespread damage to more than 150 offsite buildings. The WFC explosion is one of the most destructive incidents ever investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) as measured by the loss of life among emergency responders and civilians; the many injuries sustained by people both inside and outside the facility fenceline; and the extensive damage to residences, schools, and other structures. Following the explosion, WFC filed for bankruptcy.

The explosion happened at about 7:51 pm central daylight time (CDT), approximately 20 minutes after the first signs of a fire were reported to the local 911 emergency response dispatch center. Several local volunteer fire departments responded to the facility, which had a stockpile of between 40 and 60 tons (80,000 to 120,000 pounds) fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN), not counting additional FGAN not yet offloaded from a railcar.

More than half of the structures damaged during the explosion were demolished to make way for reconstruction. The demolished buildings include an intermediate school (552 feet southwest of the facility), a high school (1,263 feet southeast), a two-story apartment complex with 22 units (450 feet west) where two members of the public were fatally injured, and a 145-bed nursing home (500 feet west) where many of the seriously injured civilians resided. A middle school (2,000 feet southwest) also sustained serious but reparable damage. Section 3 describes the incident and its consequences in detail.

KEY ISSUES:
• REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
• HAZARD AWARENESS
• EMERGENCY PLANNING & RESPONSE
• FERTILIZER GRADE AMMONIUM NITRATE STORAGE PRACTICES
• LAND USE PLANNING & ZONING

ROOT CAUSES:
1. The presence of combustible materials used for construction of the facility and the fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) storage bins, in addition to the West Fertilizer Company (WFC) practice of storing combustibles near the FGAN pile, contributed to the progression and intensity of the fire and likely resulted in the detonation.
2. The WFC facility did not have a fire detection system to alert emergency responders or an automatic sprinkler system to extinguish the fire at an earlier stage of the incident.
3. Regulatory, Insurance, Emergency Response, Emergency & Land Use Planning deficiencies.

Image credit: CSB

An explosion at a plant that manufactured ammonium perchlorate (AP) for rocket fuel flattened the local industrial park, left a crater 125 meters across, and cracked walls 15 miles away. Two people were killed. The cause was thought to be a fire in a batch dryer. The initial explosion was at 11:53 and was equivalent to 108 tons of TNT, with a second explosion four minutes later equivalent to 235 t of TNT. Approximately 50% of the buildings in the nearby town of Henderson, Nevada were destroyed, at cost of US$70 million. A natural gas pipeline that ran under the plant was ruptured in the event and burned for one week.

[ Property Damage $300 Million. Estimated Current Value $693 Million ]

Image credit: Las Vegas Review-Journal

Fire and explosions occurred at the Miller Chemical and Fertilizer Complex, which blended raw materials to manufacture agricultural products

Damage to the facility: $20 million dollars/Shelter-inplace within a mile radius of the warehouse

Proximate causes:
• Defective equipment

Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: 911 Photography