LoC Maintenance error
Lessons
All
Asset integrity
Audits & Reviews
Commitment & Culture
Competency
Compliance with Standards
Contractor Management
Control of Work
Emergency Preparedness
Incident Investigation
LEADERSHIP
Management of Change
MONITORING & IMPROVEMENT
Operating Procedures
Operational Integrity
Operational Readiness
Performance Indicators
Process Knowledge
PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT
RISK ANALYSIS
Risk Assessment
RISK MANAGEMENT
Stakeholder Engagement
UNCONFIRMED
Workforce Involvement
Industry
All
Aerospace
Agriculture
Chemicals
Explosives
FMCG
Food & Drink
Fossil Power
Gas Processing
Laboratory
Life Sciences
LNG
LPG
Manufacturing
Metal Processing
Mining
Miscellaneous
Nuclear Power
Offshore
Refining
Onshore Oil & Gas
Petrochemicals
Pipelines
Plastics & Polymers
Pulp & Paper
Rail
Renewable Power
Road
Shipping
Storage
Warehouse
Waste Treatment
Water Treatment
Country
All
AFRICA
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
ASIA
Australia
Bahrain
Belgium
Brazil
Cameroon
Canada
China
Czech Republic
Dutch Antilles
Ecuador
Egypt
EUROPE
Finland
France
Germany
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Lithuania
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
NORTH AMERICA
Norway
AUSTRALIA
Oman
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa
SOUTH AMERICA
South Korea
South Sudan
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
Abu Dhabi
United Kingdom
United States
Venezuela
Virgin Islands
Language
All
AR
CS
DE
EN
ES
FR
IT
JA
KO
NL
PL
PT
RO
RU
SV
TR
VI
ZH
LoC
All
Adjacent explosion
Component malfunction
Confined explosion
DAMAGE
Deficiency
DEGRADATION
Deterioration
DEVIATION
DISCHARGE
Fire exposure
Genuine release
Impact
Maintenance error
Material incompatibility
Natural event
Operator error
Overpressure
Overtemperature
Structural settlement
Transport
Underpressure
Undertemperature
UNKNOWN
Incident
All
Asphyxiation
BLEVE
Blowout
Capsize
COLLAPSE
COLLISION
Conflagration
Dust explosion
EXPLOSION
Explosive decomposition
FIRE
Fireball
Flash fire
Fluid release to ground
Fluid release to water
Gas/vapour/mist/etc release to air
IMPACT
Implosion
Jet flame
Pool fire
Pressure burst
Rapid phase-transition explosion
RELEASE
Runaway reaction explosion
Solid release to air
Solid release to ground
Solid release to water
UNKNOWN
VCE
Hazards
All
Asphyxiant
Biological
Corrosive
Electrical
Environmental
Explosive
Flammable
Harmful/Irritant
Mechanical/Kinetic/Potential
Oxidising
Radiological
Reactive
Toxic
Contributory Factors
All
Blockage
Component Malfunction
Containment Failure
Corrosion/Erosion/Fatigue
Cyber Attack
Design of Plant
Domino Effect
Electrostatic Accumulation
Equipment Isolation
Error
EXTERNAL
Fatigue
Health
Housekeeping
HUMAN
Installation
Instrument Failure
Loss of Process Control
Maintenance
Management Attitude
Manufacture/Construction
Natural Event
Object impact
Organization Inadequate
ORGANIZATIONAL
Organized Procedures
Physical Security Breach
PLANT/EQUIPMENT
Process Analysis
Runaway Reaction
Staffing
Supervision
Testing
Training/Instruction
Transport Accident
UNKNOWN
User Unfriendliness
Utilities Failure
Violation
Impact
All
COST (Offsite)
COST (On Site)
ENVIRONMENTAL (Offsite)
ENVIRONMENTAL (On Site)
HUMAN (Offsite At Risk)
HUMAN (Offsite Fatalities)
HUMAN (Offsite Injuries)
HUMAN (On Site At Risk)
HUMAN (On Site Fatalities)
HUMAN (On Site Injuries)
Effects
All
> 100 Fatalities
< 100 Injuries
1-10 Fatalities
11 - 100 Fatalities
11 – 100 Fatalities
≥ 100 Injuries
Environmental
Financial
Equipment
All
Baghouse
Bearing
Blinds
Casing Seal
Conveyer Belt
Dryer
Dust Collector
Expansion Joint
Fittings (Elbow)
Gas-lift Riser
Grain Dryer
Heat Exchanger
Hoses
Instruments
Level
Mechanical
Mill
Pipe
Piping
PSV – Pilot Operated
Reactor
Rotating
Safety & Control
Shell & Tube
Silo
Tanks
Valves - Safety
Vessels
Operation
All
Air Transport
Batch Reaction
Continuous Reaction
Disposal
Electrochemical Operation
Export/Loading
Heat Exchanger
Import/Unloading
Mechanical Transfer
Movement
OTHER
Packaging
Physical Operation
Pipeline Transfer
Power Generation
PROCESS
Processing
propylene
Rail Transport
Road Transport
Ship Transport
Stockholding
STORAGE
TRANSFER
UNKNOWN
Material
All
4-hydroxybenzohydrazide
Acetal
Acetone
Acetylene
Acrylic monomers
Acrylonitrile
Adiponitrile
Alkylate
Allyl alcohol
Allyl chloride
Aluminium
Aluminium Sulphate
Ammonia
Ammonium Nitrate
Ammonium Perchlorate
Antimony Pentachloride
Azodiisobutyronitrile
Barium nitrate
Benzoyl Peroxide
Black Ink
BS&W
Butadiene
Butane
Butylene
Calcium Carbide
Carbon disulfide
Chlorine
Chlorofluoroaniline
Coal
Coke
Coke gas
Colored powder
Compressed Air
Corn
Crude Oil
Cyanide
Cyclohexane
Cyclohexanol
Cyclohexanone
Diesel fuel
Dioxin
Drilling chemicals
Ethane
Ethanol
Ethyl Acetate
Ethyl chloride
Ethylene
Ethylene Oxide
Explosives
Ferric chloride
Fertilizer
Firecrackers/Fireworks
Fish Meal
Fuel Oil
Glycol
Grain Dust
Heptane
Hexane
Hydrocarbons
Hydrochloric acid
Hydrogen
Hydrogen Chloride
Hydrogen Fluoride
Hydrogen Peroxide
Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydroxylamine
Iron
Isobutane
Isobutylene
Limestone
Liquid hydrogen
LNG
LPG
Lubricant additives
MCHM
MCMT
Mercury
Metal Dust
Methane
Methanol
Methomyl
Methyl Chloride
Methyl Ethyl Ketone
Methyl Isocyanate
Methyl Mercaptan
Methylcellulose
Mononitrotoluene
Naptha
NGL
NHP
Nitric acid
Nitric Oxide
Nitro-based fertilizer
Nitrogen
Nitromethane
Nitrous Oxide
Nylon
Octyl Phenol
Oil based solvent
Oil derivatives
Olefins
Oleum
Organic Peroxides
Ortho-Nitrochlorobenzene
Oyxgen
Paraxylene
PCB
Peroxides
Petroleum products
Petroleum/Gasoline
Phenolic resin
Phosgene
Phthalates
Pipeline additives
Plastics
Polybrominated Biphenyl
Polybutadiene
Polyethylene
Polymers
Propane
Propylene
Pyrolysis gasoline
Quartz
Radioisotopes
Resins
Sawdust
Silicon Hydride
Sodium
Sodium Chlorate
Sodium Chlorite
Sodium hydrosulfide
Sodium Hypochlorite
Steam
Steam condensate
Steel
Styrene
Sugar
Sulfuric Acid
Sunflower oil
Terpene
Titanium
Titanium Dioxide
Toluene
Unknown
Urea Ammonium Nitrate
Urea-based fertilizer
Various
Vinyl Chloride Monomer
Vinyl Fluoride
Xylene
Zinc
Zoalene
Live Event Type
All
Training
Conference
Webinar
Online Training
Workshop
Document Type
All
Alert
Article
Blog
Book
Bulletin
Case Study
Guidance
Paper
Podcast
Post
Safety Newsletter
Summary
Video
Webinar
Topics
All
Ageing
Alarm Management
Bowties
Chemical Reaction
Combustible Dust
COVID19
Cyber Security
Design
Flammable Atmospheres
Functional Safety
HAZOP
Human Factors
LOPA
Mitigation Measures
Natural Hazards
Pressure Systems
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Occupied Buildings
Work Management
Origin
All
AIChE
AIDIC
ARIA
BBC News
César Puma
CCPS
CGE Risk
Chemical Processing
CSB
Dekra
Dust Safety Science
Dutch Safety Board
EI
eMARS
EPA
EPSC
HSE
HSL
IAEA
IChemE
IChemE SLP
ioMosaic
ISC
Louise Whiting
MAIB
Marsh
Martin Carter
MKOPSC
NASA
New Zealand Government
NFPA
NRC
NTSB
OECD
Process Safety Integrity
PSA Norway
PSF
Rachael Cowin
Ramin Abhari
Red Risks
Reuters
Smithsonian Channel
Step Change in Safety
Sudaksha
TCE
TSB
TSBC
Wikipedia
WorkSafeBC
Yasmin Ali
Tag
All
Blind
Communication
Condensate
Evacuation
LOPC
LOTO
MoC
Permit
Piper
PtW
TSR
Explosion
Blowout
BOP
Cement
Contractor
Design
Drill
Fire
Macondo
Pollution
Regulatory
Rig
Training
Amusement Park
Autoignition
Banking
BLEVE
Cave Diving
Corrosion Under Insulation
Collision
High North
MHN
MSV
Protection
Riser
Rupture
Procedure
FPSO
Pump
Alarm
Quarters
Camarupim
PSSR
Risk
Deethaniser
Injection
USGP
Erosion
Corrosion
Humber
Geometry
Washwater
Fatality
Texas
Blowdown
NSU
PSV
Trailer
Overfill
ISOM
Splitter
Vent
Richmond
CDU
Silicon
HTSC
Pipe
Fittings
Smoke
Radar
Grounding
Boom
Reef
Ice
Fatigue
OPA
Alcohol
Valdez
VLCC
ATG
Buncefield
Bund
Drain
Gasoline
Human
IHLS
Level
Tank
Flixborough
Competence
Layout
Caprolactam
Bellows
QA
Planning
Temporary
UVCE
Building
Castleford
Jet
MNT
Runaway
CoW
Muster
Nitration
Hickson
PHA
Olefin
Geismar
Exchanger
Hierarchy
Valve
Accountability
MIC
Toxic
Scrubber
Control
Bhopal
Isolation
Sabotage
CMP
Cork
Exotherm
HAZOP
BD
Decomposition
Overpressure
Pharmachem
Reactor
Mile
Melt
Core
Instrumentation
PRV
PWR
Containment
RBMK
Chernobyl
Graphite
Criticality
Radiation
Void
BWR
Fukushima
Regulator
Power
Earthquake
Hydrogen
LOCA
Tsunami
Abbeystead
Methane
Tunnel
Aluminium
Camelford
Flocculant
Monitoring
Emergency
Dust
Preparedness
Leadership
Housekeeping
Sugar
Wentworth
Blockage
Combustion Control
Boil Over
Compressed Gas
Confirmation Bias
Contamination
Creeping Change
Draining
Equipment Identification
Expired Chemicals
Firefighting
Fireproofing
Hot Spots
Winterization
Flanges
High Pressure Water
Laboratory Safety
Hydrogen Attack
Lifting Operations
Loss of Utilities
Low Temperature Embrittlement
Mechanical Seals
Metal Fatigue
Flare Systems
Modern Technology
Nuclear Safety
Normalization of Deviance
Positive Isolation
Release Containment
Safe Operating Limits
Thermal Expansion
Threaded Equipment
Well Control
Water Hammer
Testing
Stress Corrosion Cracking
Security
Permit To Work
Furnaces
Implosion
Inert Atmospheres
Learning from Incidents
Static discharge
Startup Operations
Shift Handover
Relief Systems
Project Management
Process Interruptions
EBV
Embrittlement
Longford
McKee
Chlorine
Dead-leg
Freeze
FCC
DCS
Milford
Maintenance
Troubleshooting
Alarms
Catalyst
Moerdijk
Startup
Floating Roof Tanks
Remote
Virtual
H2S
Hydrogen Sulphide
Minute To Learn
Occupational Safety
Deepwater Horizon
LFL
Worksite Checks
Coastal Flooding
HDPE
Career Path
Grenfell Tower
Configuration Control
Safety Critical Decisions
Time Pressures
Small Businesses
eMARS
Leak Detection
Railways
OECD
Framework
Hand Sanitizer
COMAH
Safety Literacy
Vibration
Electrostatic
April
Summary
On April 8, 2004, four workers were seriously injured when highly flammable gasoline components were released and ignited at the Giant Industries Ciniza refinery, east of Gallup, New Mexico. The
Summary
On April 8, 2004, four workers were seriously injured when highly flammable gasoline components were released and ignited at the Giant Industries Ciniza refinery, east of Gallup, New Mexico. The release occurred as maintenance workers were removing a malfunctioning pump from the refinery’s hydrofluoric acid (HF) alkylation unit. Unknown to personnel, a shut-off valve connecting the pump to a distillation column was apparently in the open position, leading to the release and subsequent explosions.
KEY ISSUES:
• MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
• CORROSION & SCALE FORMATION
• VALVE DESIGN
• HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATION
• MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
• LOCKOUT/TAGOUT & ISOLATION
ROOT CAUSES:
1. An MOC hazard analysis was not conducted.
2. the facility lacked procedures to verify that the pump had been isolated, depressurized and drained.
3. Instead of determining the cause of frequent pump malfunctions and then implementing a program that would prevent problems before they occurred, Giant used breakdown maintenance by making repeated repairs to the pump seals after failure.
Image Credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
Summary
An oil spill occurred due to a failure of a block valve to seat properly during maintenance on a pump strainer in the visbreaker unit. The oil auto-ignited and the
Summary
An oil spill occurred due to a failure of a block valve to seat properly during maintenance on a pump strainer in the visbreaker unit. The oil auto-ignited and the ensuing fire spread and destroyed the visbreaker and damaged adjacent equipment. Subsequent explosions, heat restricted fire fighting access, inadequately trained fire brigade personnel, and damage to the firewater distribution system further hindered extinguishing the fire in a timely manner. The fire was spread by the firewater application, and was finally extinguished with the help of the local fire department.
[ Property Damage $159 Million. Estimated Current Value $271 Million ]
Image credit: Citgo
Origin
Summary
On April 26, 2018, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at the Superior Refinery Company LLC refinery in Superior, Wisconsin (‘Husky Superior Refinery’). The incident occurred in the refinery’s Fluid
Summary
On April 26, 2018, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at the Superior Refinery Company LLC refinery in Superior, Wisconsin (‘Husky Superior Refinery’). The incident occurred in the refinery’s Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU). In preparation for the shutdown, the refinery brought in hundreds of contractors and increased operations staffing. The contractors were performing many tasks such as electrical work, preparing for chemical cleaning, building scaffolding, and welding. As a result of the explosion, thirty-six people sought medical attention, including eleven refinery and contract workers who suffered OSHA recordable injuries. In addition, a large portion of Superior, Wisconsin was evacuated. The refinery was shutting down in preparation for a five-week turnaround when an explosion occurred, sending several people to area hospitals with injuries.
KEY ISSUES:
• PYROPHORIC IRON SULFIDE
Image credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
June
Summary
Shortly after 6pm, on 2 June 2011, an atmospheric storage tank within the amine regeneration unit at the Chevron Pembroke Refinery exploded. A fireball split the tank open and killed
Summary
Shortly after 6pm, on 2 June 2011, an atmospheric storage tank within the amine regeneration unit at the Chevron Pembroke Refinery exploded. A fireball split the tank open and killed four workers: Robert Broome, Julie Jones, Dennis Riley and Andrew Jenkins. The sole survivor, Andrew Phillips, sustained severe burns and suffered life-changing injuries.
The force of the explosion ejected the five-tonne steel tank roof over 55 metres through the air. After narrowly missing a multi-fuel pipe track, the roof crashed onto a pressurised storage sphere containing extremely flammable butane. Good fortune prevented the airborne roof from puncturing the butane storage vessel, which would have led to an uncontrolled release of liquified petroleum gas (LPG).
The explosion was caused by the unintended ignition of a flammable atmosphere within the tank (17T302), during what should have been a routine cleaning operation conducted in preparation for maintenance.
KEY ISSUES:
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• PERMIT SYSTEM
• CONTROL OF CONTRACTORS
• RISK ASSESSMENT
• COMPETENCE
Image Credit: HSE
Origin
HSEUK Health & Safety Executive
Summary
An explosion at the Partridge-Raleigh oilfield in Raleigh, Mississippi. The incident occurred at about 8:30 a.m. on June 5, 2006, when Stringer’s Oilfield Services contract workers were installing pipe from
Summary
An explosion at the Partridge-Raleigh oilfield in Raleigh, Mississippi. The incident occurred at about 8:30 a.m. on June 5, 2006, when Stringer’s Oilfield Services contract workers were installing pipe from two production tanks to a third. Welding sparks ignited flammable vapor escaping from an open-ended pipe about four feet from the contractors’ welding activity on tank 4. The explosion killed three workers who were standing on top of tanks 3 and 4. A fourth worker was seriously injured.
KEY ISSUES:
• HOT WORK CONTROL
• SAFE WORK PRACTICES AT OIL & GAS PRODUCTION WELLS
ROOT CAUSES:
1. A gas detector was not used to test for flammable vapor.
2. ‘Flashing’ tanks containing hydrocarbons with a lit oxy-acetylene torch to determine the presence of flammable vapor is unsafe and extremely dangerous.
3. The open pipe on the adjacent tank was not capped or otherwise isolated.
4. A makeshift work platform – a ladder placed between the tanks – was used.
5. All tanks were interconnected and some of the tanks contained flammable residue and crude oil.
Image credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
Summary
A contractor died after entering a confined space at Dow Chemical’s plant in Oyster Creek. Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285) Image Credit:
Summary
A contractor died after entering a confined space at Dow Chemical’s plant in Oyster Creek.
Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Unidentified
Origin
MKOPSCMary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center
Summary
On June 9, 2009, a major natural gas explosion heavily damaged the ConAgra Slim Jim meat processing factory in Garner, North Carolina, just south of Raleigh. Three workers were crushed
Summary
On June 9, 2009, a major natural gas explosion heavily damaged the ConAgra Slim Jim meat processing factory in Garner, North Carolina, just south of Raleigh. Three workers were crushed to death when a large section of the building collapsed. The explosion critically burned four others and sent a total of 71 people to the hospital including three firefighters who were exposed to toxic anhydrous ammonia from the plant’s refrigeration system. Approximately 18,000 pounds of ammonia were released to the environment and 100,000 square feet of the plant were damaged. Due to the severity of the structural collapse, there was the potential for numerous additional deaths or serious injuries.
KEY ISSUES:
• DIRECTLY VENT PURGED GASES TO A SAFE LOCATION OUTDOORS, AWAY FROM PEOPLE AND IGNITION SOURCES.
• USE COMBUSTIBLE GAS DETECTORS TO MONITOR THE GAS CONCENTRATION DURING PURGING OPERATIONS.
• ENSURE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN GAS PURGING OPERATIONS ARE FULLY TRAINED.
ROOT CAUSES:
1. Purging into equipment vicinity is common practice
Image credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
Related Events
Summary
On 11 June 1987 a team of four contractors was cleaning a crude oil storage tank at the Dalmeny Oil Storage Terminal. The tank was of the floating roof type
Summary
On 11 June 1987 a team of four contractors was cleaning a crude oil storage tank at the Dalmeny Oil Storage Terminal. The tank was of the floating roof type and the roof had been lowered due to the tank being empty. It was resting on a series of 219 support pillars. Three of the contractors worked inside the tank with one on duty outside along with a BP employee.
The tank had been emptied of its contents and three roof manhole covers opened to allow natural ventilation. However, the evolution of a vapour with the risk of forming an explosive atmosphere was not considered sufficient to merit either mechanical ventilation or rigorous monitoring of the vapour concentrations within the tank. As a precaution though, the workers were required to wear airline-breathing apparatus supplied by a compressor located outside the tank bund.
At 13:20 hours the outside man looked in and saw a ring of fire surrounding the three men. Two of the employees managed to escape the fire but the third man died from the effects of asphyxiation and burns. The fire escalated rapidly with flames and smoke coming out of the open man ways.
The cause of the accident was one of the contractors smoking inside the oil tank. It was apparently common practice for the workers to remove their breathing apparatus while inside the tank, with some workers choosing to smoke while the supervisor was not looking. On this occasion one of the men working in the tank had dropped a lit cigarette on to the floor where it had ignited the crude oil.
KEY ISSUES:
• MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES
• SITE SECURITY
• HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION / FLAMEPROOFING
• TRAINING
• ISOLATION
Report: https://www.icheme.org/media/13700/the-fires-and-explosion-at-bp-oil-grangemouth-refinery-ltd.pdf
Image Credit: HSE
Origin
HSEUK Health & Safety Executive
Summary
An explosion occurred when employees were attempting to isolate a leak on a condensate line between the natural gas liquid (NGL) plant and the refinery. Three crude units were damaged
Summary
An explosion occurred when employees were attempting to isolate a leak on a condensate line between the natural gas liquid (NGL) plant and the refinery. Three crude units were damaged and two reformers were destroyed. The fire was extinguished approximately nine hours after the initial explosion. Five people were killed and 50 others were injured. The initial investigation into the loss indicated a lack of inspection and maintenance of the condensate line, which was not owned by the refinery. A lack of clear understanding of the ownership of the line is thought to have delayed the isolation of it.
[ Property Damage $412 Million. Estimated Current Value $718 Million ]
KEY ISSUES:
• Ownership and responsibility for equipment should be understood
• Third party interfaces must be managed
• Quality maintenance and inspection regimes are critical for plant integrity
Image credit: KNPC
Origin
Related Events
Summary
A natural gas pipeline explosion and fire occurred at a gas booster station as a crew worked on a 4-inch gas line. The workers were replacing some gas lines, repairing
Summary
A natural gas pipeline explosion and fire occurred at a gas booster station as a crew worked on a 4-inch gas line. The workers were replacing some gas lines, repairing a ruptured line.
Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: News Channel 10 Amarillo
Origin
MKOPSCMary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center
July
Summary
An explosion occurred at a chemical plant. Before the explosion, some workers were welding the interior of waste water storage. The blast tore out the upper structure of the storage
Summary
An explosion occurred at a chemical plant. Before the explosion, some workers were welding the interior of waste water storage. The blast tore out the upper structure of the storage facility, which subsequently collapsed
Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: BBC
Origin
MKOPSCMary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center
Summary
A release and ignition of gas condensate from a section of piping in the gas compression module of this platform set off a chain of fires and explosions, resulting in
Summary
A release and ignition of gas condensate from a section of piping in the gas compression module of this platform set off a chain of fires and explosions, resulting in the almost total destruction of the facility. The condensate was released from the site of a pressure relief valve that had been removed for maintenance when this section of piping was inadvertently pressurized.
The severity of the accident was largely due to the contribution of oil and gas from ruptured pipelines connected to the platform and the disabling of nearly all emergency systems as a result of the initial explosion. The compression module had been retrofitted to the platform adjacent to the control room, which was rendered useless by the initial explosion.
In addition, the firewater pumps had been placed in to manual operation mode due to divers being in the water prior to the accident.
There were 226 people on the platform at the time of the accident; only 61 survived. Contributing to the loss of life was the location of the quarters, which was directly over the site of the initial release and resulting explosion and fire.
[ Property Damage $850 Million. Estimated Current Value $1963 Million ]
KEY ISSUES:
• MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
• PERSONAL SAFETY OVER PROCESS SAFETY
• ISOLATION AND PERMITS FOR MAINTENANCE
• HANDOVER
• SAFETY CULTURE
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Image Credit: Press Association
Origin
HSEUK Health & Safety Executive
Related Events
References
Summary
This event occurred on a crude unit at this 360,000 bbl per day refinery. A furnace was undergoing maintenance when a worker performed a hot cut and material was released.
Summary
This event occurred on a crude unit at this 360,000 bbl per day refinery. A furnace was undergoing maintenance when a worker performed a hot cut and material was released. Inadequate flushing and blinding and a work scope that did not meet normal industry practices appear to have been the likely causes.
[ Property Damage $100 Million. Estimated Current Value $199 Million ]
Image credit: Rosneft
Origin
Summary
On July 17, 2001, an explosion occurred at the Motiva Enterprises LLC Delaware City Refinery (DCR) in Delaware City, Delaware. Jeffrey Davis, a boilermaker with The Washington Group International, Inc.
Summary
On July 17, 2001, an explosion occurred at the Motiva Enterprises LLC Delaware City Refinery (DCR) in Delaware City, Delaware. Jeffrey Davis, a boilermaker with The Washington Group International, Inc. (WGI), the primary maintenance contractor at DCR, was killed; eight others were injured.
A crew of WGI contractors was repairing grating on a catwalk in a sulfuric acid (H2SO4) storage tank farm when a spark from their hot work ignited flammable vapors in one of the storage tanks. The tank separated from its floor, instantaneously releasing its contents. Other tanks in the tank farm also released their contents. A fire burned for approximately one-half hour; and H2SO4 reached the Delaware River, resulting in significant damage to aquatic life. .
KEY ISSUES:
• MECHANICAL INTEGRITY
• ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
• MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
• HOT WORK SYSTEMS
ROOT CAUSES:
1. Motiva did not have an adequate mechanical integrity management system to prevent and address safety and environmental hazards from the deterioration of H2SO4 storage tanks.
2. Motiva engineering management and MOC systems inadequately addressed conversion of the tanks from fresh to spent acid service.
3. The Motiva hot work program was inadequate.
Image Credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
Related Events
Summary
A vapor-cloud explosion centered in the Cryogenic Unit No. 2 and two subsequent explosions in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 occurred at this gas-processing complex. As a result of the
Summary
A vapor-cloud explosion centered in the Cryogenic Unit No. 2 and two subsequent explosions in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 occurred at this gas-processing complex. As a result of the explosions, the Cryogenic Unit No. 2 and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) product pumps in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 were extensively damaged, the control rooms for both units were destroyed, and the remainder of the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 experienced minor damage.
Plant personnel noticed that one of the two LPG product pumps in the Cryogenic Unit No. 1 had a seal leak. Consequently, plant personnel decided to have the faulty seal replaced. In preparation for the maintenance work on the LPG product pump, the motor-operated valve (MOV) in the suction line and the isolation valve in the discharge line of this pump were manually closed. A spectacle blind was then inserted into the pump flange on the suction side of the pump. After the seal was replaced, plant personnel removed the blind and were in the process of tightening the flange bolts when LPG product began to leak from this flange. A vapor cloud formed and drifted into the Cryogenic Unit No. 2. It was ignited and resulted in the initial explosion. Following the explosions, it was determined that the MOV in the suction line of the pump was in the open position, which allowed the LPG product to reach the pump flange. The fire brigades successfully extinguished the fire following the explosions after approximately three hours, and protected the adjacent LPG spheres. If these spheres had failed due to BLEVE, the property plant damage would have been substantially greater. Although the explosions damaged the electric power in the plant and rendered the electric motor-driven fire water pumps non-operational, fire water was provided by two diesel engine driven fire water pumps. Because of this incident, the 2.13 billion-cubic-feet-per-year gas-processing capacity at this complex was shut down, disrupting one third of Mexico’s total gas-processing capacity.
[ Property Damage $137 Million. Estimated Current Value $260 Million ]
Image credit: PEMEX
Origin
Summary
Three workers were killed in an explosion at the Packaging Corporation of America (PCA) fiberboard manufacturing facility while they were welding on a temporary metal clamp to stabilize a damaged
Summary
Three workers were killed in an explosion at the Packaging Corporation of America (PCA) fiberboard manufacturing facility while they were welding on a temporary metal clamp to stabilize a damaged flange connection. The flange was located on top of an 80-foot tall storage tank that contained recycled water and fiber waste.
Facility personnel were unaware of the potential presence of flammable gas from the decomposition of the organic material in the tank, and combustible gas monitoring was not typically required or performed prior to starting work. At the time of the accident, three workers were on a catwalk above the tank; one began welding the flange into place when sparks from the welding ignited flammable vapors inside the tank. The resulting explosion ripped open the tank lid, knocking two of the workers to the ground 80 feet below. All three workers died of traumatic injuries. A fourth worker, who had been observing the work from a distance, survived with minor injuries.
KEY ISSUES:
• ANALYZE THE HAZARDS
• MONITOR THE ATMOSPHERE
• TEST THE AREA
ROOT CAUSES:
1. Anaerobic bacteria
2. Hot work
Image credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
Related Events
August
Summary
On August 12, 2016, seven workers were injured – three critically – when a flash fire occurred during hot work activities at Sunoco Logistics Partners, a terminal facility in Nederland,
Summary
On August 12, 2016, seven workers were injured – three critically – when a flash fire occurred during hot work activities at Sunoco Logistics Partners, a terminal facility in Nederland, Texas.
KEY ISSUES:
• HOT WORK
Image credit: CSB
Origin
CSBUS Chemical Safety Board
Summary
While a worker was welding on top of a tank that contained one million gallons of sodium hydrosulfide a massive explosion occurred. Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process
Summary
While a worker was welding on top of a tank that contained one million gallons of sodium hydrosulfide a massive explosion occurred.
Source: A web-based collection and analysis of process safety incidents (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0950423016302285)
Image Credit: Alicia Turner
Origin
MKOPSCMary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center