Name: La Mede Refinery Explosion 1992
Start: 2023-11-9
End: 2023-11-9

Country France

Lessons

Industry

Country

Language

LoC

Incident

Hazards

Contributory Factors

Impact

Effects

Equipment

Operation

Material

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November

202309NovAll DayLa Mede Refinery Explosion 1992Total La Mede (FR)Industry:RefiningCountry:FranceLanguage:ENLoC:Deterioration Origin: Marsh Incident:VCEHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (On Site At Risk)Effects:EnvironmentalMaterial:Hydrocarbons

Summary

A vapor cloud explosion occurred in the gas plant associated with the 29,700 bbl/d FCC unit on a 136,000 bbl/d refinery. The initial vapor cloud explosion and several subsequent lesser explosions could be heard in Marseille, approximately 18 miles from the refinery. An estimated 11,000 pounds of light hydrocarbons were involved in the initial explosion. A gas detection system in the FCC unit sounded an alarm indicating a major gas leak. While the unit operator was contacting the security service to warn of this situation, the initial explosion occurred. The initial gas release is believed to have resulted from a pipe rupture in the gas plant, which was used to recover butane and propane produced in the FCC unit. The explosions and subsequent fires devastated about two hectares of this refinery, which covers an area of about 250 hectares. The gas plant, FCC unit, and associated control building were completely destroyed by this incident. Two new process units, which were under construction and scheduled to come into operation in 1993, were seriously damaged. Outside of the refinery, roofs were damaged in the nearby town of Chateauneuf les Martigues and windows were broken within a radius of 3,000 feet. Some windows were broken up to six miles away.

The refinery fire brigade and more than 250 fire fighters from three neighboring industrial sites and four nearby towns were used for more than six hours to bring this incident under control. Approximately 37,000 US gallons of foam concentrate were used during the fire fighting effort. Some fires were intentionally left burning after the incident was under control to allow safe depressurizing of the process units since the flare system was partially damaged by the explosions.

Click to access FD_3969_La_Mede_1992_ang.pdf

[ Property Damage $225 Million. Estimated Current Value $474 Million ]

Image credit: Total

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Origin

Marsh

202328NovAll DayNoroxo Legionella Incident 2003Noroxo Harnes (FR)Lessons:Operational IntegrityIndustry:ChemicalsCountry:FranceLanguage:ENLoC:Genuine release Origin: ARIA Incident:Gas/vapour/mist/etc release to airHazards:BiologicalImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Fatalities)Effects:11 - 100 Fatalities

Summary

On November 28, 2003, two cases of Legionnaire’s Disease were recorded, the first symptoms of which dated back to the beginning of November. The dates of outbreak of the pathology, which were then staggered over time, revealed two distinct waves of contamination with a total of 86 individuals contaminated, aged between 32 and 92 (of whom 18 died).

These cases all broke out within a radius of slightly over 10 km around the city of Lens. The DDASS (local Sanitary and Social Affairs Office) conducted environmental investigations at the homes of patients and within several facilities open to the public. At the request of the DRIRE (Regional Agency for the Environment, Research and Industry), all facilities operating cooling towers within the designated zone were asked to adopt measures to identify the eventual presence of legionella and clean their circuits. On October 15, the operator of a chemical installation specialised in alcohols and fatty acids extracted samples whose results revealed a concentration of legionella at a level of 730,000 CFU units/litre. Following a shock treatment using biocides, analyses 15 days later yielded a concentration of less than 100 CFU/litre. On November 20, another inspection announced that the level of 600,000 CFU/litre had been reached.

In light of these results, the chemical plant’s cooling towers were ordered to be shut down on November 29. As of December 3, the tower circuits were drained and cleaned. Operations resumed on December 22, and a prefectural decree was issued January 2, 2004 mandating the operator to halt all plant activity once again due to the appearance of a second epidemic wave. High pressure cleaning work could have induced the dispersion of a contaminated aerosol. At the same time, the Prefect commissioned the DRIRE Agency to extend its investigations, notably by inventorying all cooling towers within the neighbouring 53 towns and imposed the shutdown of several installations (automobile washing stations, food processing activities, refrigerated warehousing, etc.), causing layoffs to hundreds of workers for several days. Even though a similarity was detected between the strains extracted from 23 of the patients and those present in the suspected cooling tower at the petrochemical plant, other sources of contamination could not be ruled out. High legionella counts in the lagoons of this same plant necessitated turning off aerators on January 20. This site’s revenue loss would amount to several millions of Euros, corresponding to a production downtime of 14 weeks. A prefectural order authorising reactivation of the towers was issued on March 19, 2004, yet the plant would never operate again.

Image credit: TF1

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Origin

ARIABureau for Analysis of Industrial Risks and Pollutions

December

202322DecAll DayLavera Fire 2012Ineos Lavera (FR)Industry:PetrochemicalsCountry:FranceLanguage:ENLoC:Overpressure Origin: Marsh Incident:FIREHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (On Site At Risk)Effects:EnvironmentalMaterial:Ethylene

January

202404JanAll DayFeyzin LPG Explosion 1966Total Feyzin (FR)Lessons:Asset integrity,Emergency Preparedness,Operating ProceduresIndustry:LPGCountry:FranceLanguage:ENLoC:Operator error Origin: HSE Incident:VCEHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (On Site Fatalities)Effects:11 – 100 FatalitiesMaterial:Propane

Summary

On 4th January 1966, an operation to drain off an aqueous layer from a propane storage sphere was attempted. Two valves were opened in series on the bottom of the sphere. When the operation was nearly complete, the upper valve was closed and then cracked open again. No flow came out of the cracked valve, so it was opened further. The blockage, assumed to be ice or hydrate, cleared and propane gushed out. The operator was unable to close the upper valve and by the time he attempted to close the lower valve this was also frozen open. The alarm was raised and traffic on the nearby motorway was stopped. The resulting vapour cloud is thought to have found its source of ignition from a car about 160 m away. The storage sphere was enveloped in a fierce fire and upon lifting of the relief valve a stream of escaping vapour was ignited.

The LPG tank farm where the sphere was located consisted of four 1200 m3 propane and four 2000 m3 butane spheres. The fire brigade arrived on site, but were not experienced in dealing in refinery fires, and it appears they did not attempt to cool the burning sphere. They concentrated their hoses on cooling the remaining spheres. About 90 minutes after the initial leakage, the sphere ruptured, killing the men nearby. A wave of liquid propane flowed over the compound wall and fragments of the ruptured sphere cut through the legs of the next sphere which toppled over. The relief valve on this tank began to emit liquid.

The fire killed 18 people and injured 81 others. Five of the storage spheres were destroyed.

KEY ISSUES:
• DESIGN CODES – PIPEWORK
• SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE / SPILL CONTROL
• DESIGN CODES – PLANT

Image Credit: Fonds Georges Vermard

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Origin

HSEUK Health & Safety Executive

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Feyzin 1966Jan 05 2020 (All Day)

Lessons

IChemE S&LP: Feyzin Incident Summary (04-Jan-66) (icheme.org)

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