Name: PEMEX LPG Explosion 1984
Start: 2023-11-19
End: 2023-11-19

Industry LPG

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November

202319NovAll DayPEMEX LPG Explosion 1984PEMEX LPG San Juanico (MX)Lessons:Asset integrity,Emergency Preparedness,Operational Integrity,Risk Assessment,Stakeholder EngagementIndustry:LPGCountry:MexicoLanguage:ENLoC:Overpressure Origin: HSE Incident:BLEVE,VCEHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (Offsite Fatalities)Effects:> 100 FatalitiesMaterial:LPGTopics:Occupied Buildings

Summary

At approximately 05:35 hours on 19 November 1984 a major fire and a series of catastrophic explosions occurred at the government owned and operated PEMEX LPG Terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City. As a consequence of these events some 500 individuals were killed and the terminal destroyed.

Three refineries supplied the facility with LPG on a daily basis. The plant was being filled from a refinery 400 km away, as on the previous day it had become almost empty. Two large spheres and 48 cylindrical vessels were filled to 90% and 4 smaller spheres to 50% full.

A drop in pressure was noticed in the control room and also at a pipeline pumping station. An 8-inch pipe between a sphere and a series of cylinders had ruptured. Unfortunately the operators could not identify the cause of the pressure drop. The release of LPG continued for about 5-10 minutes when the gas cloud, estimated at 200 m x 150 m x 2 m high, drifted to a flare stack. It ignited, causing violent ground shock. A number of ground fires occurred. Workers on the plant now tried to deal with the escape taking various action. At a late stage somebody pressed the emergency shut down button.

About fifteen minutes after the initial release the first BLEVE occurred. For the next hour and a half there followed a series of BLEVEs as the LPG vessels violently exploded. LPG was said to rain down and surfaces covered in the liquid were set alight. The explosions were recorded on a seismograph at the University of Mexico.

KEY ISSUES:
• PLANT LAYOUT
• ISOLATION
• ACTIVE / PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION
• LEAK / GAS DETECTION
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE / SPILL CONTROL

Image Credit: Mexico News Daily

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Origin

HSEUK Health & Safety Executive

January

202404JanAll DayFeyzin LPG Explosion 1966Total Feyzin (FR)Lessons:Asset integrity,Emergency Preparedness,Operating ProceduresIndustry:LPGCountry:FranceLanguage:ENLoC:Operator error Origin: HSE Incident:VCEHazards:FlammableImpact:HUMAN (On Site Fatalities)Effects:11 – 100 FatalitiesMaterial:Propane

Summary

On 4th January 1966, an operation to drain off an aqueous layer from a propane storage sphere was attempted. Two valves were opened in series on the bottom of the sphere. When the operation was nearly complete, the upper valve was closed and then cracked open again. No flow came out of the cracked valve, so it was opened further. The blockage, assumed to be ice or hydrate, cleared and propane gushed out. The operator was unable to close the upper valve and by the time he attempted to close the lower valve this was also frozen open. The alarm was raised and traffic on the nearby motorway was stopped. The resulting vapour cloud is thought to have found its source of ignition from a car about 160 m away. The storage sphere was enveloped in a fierce fire and upon lifting of the relief valve a stream of escaping vapour was ignited.

The LPG tank farm where the sphere was located consisted of four 1200 m3 propane and four 2000 m3 butane spheres. The fire brigade arrived on site, but were not experienced in dealing in refinery fires, and it appears they did not attempt to cool the burning sphere. They concentrated their hoses on cooling the remaining spheres. About 90 minutes after the initial leakage, the sphere ruptured, killing the men nearby. A wave of liquid propane flowed over the compound wall and fragments of the ruptured sphere cut through the legs of the next sphere which toppled over. The relief valve on this tank began to emit liquid.

The fire killed 18 people and injured 81 others. Five of the storage spheres were destroyed.

KEY ISSUES:
• DESIGN CODES – PIPEWORK
• SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
• OPERATING PROCEDURES
• EMERGENCY RESPONSE / SPILL CONTROL
• DESIGN CODES – PLANT

Image Credit: Fonds Georges Vermard

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Origin

HSEUK Health & Safety Executive

Related Events

Feyzin 1966Jan 05 2020 (All Day)

Lessons

IChemE S&LP: Feyzin Incident Summary (04-Jan-66) (icheme.org)

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